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arbitrationpartnershiparbitrator
plaintiffdefendantarbitrationattorneystatuteappealtrialcorporationarbitrator

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Schoonmaker v. Cummings and Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., 252 Conn. 416, 747 A.2d 1017, 24 Employee Benefits Cas. 1438

Facts

Samuel V. Schoonmaker III, a former partner at Cummings and Lockwood, resigned after 35 years to start his own practice. His partnership and employment agreements provided for postemployment benefits but included a noncompetition clause that forfeited benefits if he practiced law within three years of retirement. Despite meeting age and service requirements for benefits, the firm denied his claims due to his continued practice. An arbitration ruling upheld the firm's position, leading Schoonmaker to seek to vacate the award in court.

The plaintiff, Samuel V. Schoonmaker III, is a former partner in the defendant law firm of Cummings and Lockwood (firm). He was also a stockholder in the firm's parent corporation, Cummings and Lockwood of Connecticut, P.C., which also is a defendant in this action.

Issue

The main legal issues include the appropriate standard of review for arbitration decisions involving professional conduct rules and whether the forfeiture provision in the employment agreement violates public policy.

This case raises several significant issues on appeal. First, as a matter of first impression for this court, we must determine the proper standard of review that a trial court should exercise in reviewing an arbitration decision involving the interpretation and application of rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Rule

The court determined that de novo review is the proper standard when reviewing arbitration decisions that involve the interpretation of professional conduct rules, specifically Rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

We conclude that in such a case, de novo review, rather than the traditional, more deferential review afforded to arbitration decisions, is proper.

Analysis

The court applied the de novo review standard to assess whether the arbitrator's decision violated public policy. It concluded that while Rule 5.6 promotes client choice, it does not require absolute cessation of practice as a condition for retirement benefits. The court found that the arbitrator's interpretation of the forfeiture provision was reasonable and did not contravene public policy.

We conclude further, however, that although the public policy embodied in rule 5.6, in part, promotes clients' access to an attorney of their choice, that policy does not require the absolute cessation of practice as a condition of retirement under the retirement benefits exception of the rule.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the arbitration award, concluding that Schoonmaker forfeited his entitlement to postemployment benefits by practicing law within the prohibited timeframe. The decision emphasized the validity of the noncompetition provision under the circumstances.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court improperly applied a less searching standard.

Who won?

Cummings and Lockwood prevailed in the case because the court upheld the arbitration award, finding that the forfeiture provision was valid and did not violate public policy.

The defendants thereafter filed an “Application to Confirm Arbitration Award” pursuant to General Statutes § 52–417, arguing that the trial court must afford the arbitrator's award due deference in that its findings of fact, legal analysis, and conclusions are based upon a thorough and reasonable interpretation of the legal and factual issues in [the] case, and the award did not violate public policy.

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