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Keywords

defendantdamagesnegligencetrialverdictmalpracticewillcorporationlegislative intent
plaintiffdefendantdamagesnegligencetrialverdictmotionmalpracticewillcorporationsustainedmotion to dismiss

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Schwartz v. Brownlee, 253 Va. 159, 482 S.E.2d 827

Facts

William Brownlee was diagnosed with prostate cancer and underwent surgery performed by Dr. Schwartz, who was the president and sole shareholder of MMC. Following the surgery, Brownlee experienced severe postoperative complications, leading to total incontinence. Brownlee filed a medical malpractice suit against Dr. Schwartz and MMC, alleging that Dr. Schwartz's negligence as an agent of MMC caused his injuries. The jury found in favor of Brownlee, awarding him $1.85 million, but the trial court later reduced the amount against Dr. Schwartz to $1 million, applying the statutory cap for medical malpractice cases.

In an amended motion for judgment filed below, Brownlee sought damages from Dr. Schwartz, a licensed health care provider, and his wholly owned corporation, Metropolitan Medical Care, Inc. (MMC), a non-health care provider (the defendants). Brownlee alleged that he had sustained injuries as a result of Dr. Schwartz's post-operative negligence while acting as the agent of MMC.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether Dr. Schwartz was acting as an agent of MMC during the relevant times and whether MMC was entitled to the protection of the statutory medical malpractice cap.

The trial court erred when it denied defendant MMC's Motion to Dismiss as to it as a matter of law and instead directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of whether Dr. Schwartz's performance of medical services was as an agent of MMC.

Rule

The court applied the principle that a corporation not licensed as a health care provider is not entitled to the statutory cap on damages in medical malpractice cases, even if it is jointly liable with a licensed health care provider.

In any verdict returned against a health care provider in an action for malpractice where the act or acts of malpractice occurred on or after October 1, 1983, which is tried by a jury or in any judgment entered against a health care provider in such an action which is tried without a jury, the total amount recoverable for any injury to, or death of, a patient shall not exceed one million dollars.

Analysis

The court found sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Dr. Schwartz was acting as an agent of MMC when he provided medical services to Brownlee. However, since MMC was not a licensed health care provider, it could not claim the protection of the statutory cap. The court distinguished this case from others where both defendants were health care providers, emphasizing that the legislative intent was to limit the cap's application to licensed providers only.

The evidence shows that the extensive authority Dr. Schwartz indisputably granted to MMC over his affairs, including MMC's dominion over the purse strings, clearly vested MMC with the power of control sufficient to support the trial court's finding, as a matter of law, that an agency relationship did exist between Dr. Schwartz and MMC at the time Dr. Schwartz rendered post-operative treatment to Brownlee.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that MMC was not entitled to the statutory cap and that the trial court's findings regarding agency were supported by the evidence.

For the reasons assigned, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Who won?

William Brownlee prevailed in the case because the court upheld the jury's verdict against Dr. Schwartz and MMC, affirming that MMC was not entitled to the statutory cap due to its status as a non-health care provider.

William Brownlee prevailed in the case because the court upheld the jury's verdict against Dr. Schwartz and MMC, affirming that MMC was not entitled to the statutory cap due to its status as a non-health care provider.

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