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Keywords

contractsettlementdivorcecontractual obligation

contractsettlementdivorcerespondentappellant

Related Cases

Shelton v. Shelton, 119 Nev. 492, 78 P.3d 507

Facts

Roland and Maryann Shelton were married in 1980, and during their marriage, Roland served in the U.S. Navy. They divorced in 1997, with a decree that designated both military retirement and disability pay as community property, but awarded all disability pay to Roland. After Roland was rated 100% disabled in 1999, he waived his military retirement benefits for disability pay and ceased payments to Maryann, prompting her to seek enforcement of the divorce decree.

Respondent Roland Shelton and appellant Maryann Shelton were married on September 6, 1980, in San Diego, California. Roland served in the United States Navy for more than ten years during the marriage.

Issue

Whether a former spouse can seek relief when a veteran unilaterally waives his military pension for disability benefits, resulting in the loss of the former spouse's community share in the pension.

The question of the interpretation of a contract when the facts are not in dispute is a question of law.

Rule

While federal law prohibits states from treating veterans' disability pay as community property, state contract law is not preempted by federal law, allowing enforcement of contractual obligations established in divorce settlements.

Although states cannot divide disability payments as community property, states are not preempted from enforcing orders that are res judicata or from enforcing contracts or from reconsidering divorce decrees, even when disability pay is involved.

Analysis

The court determined that the divorce settlement agreement was ambiguous, as it designated military disability as community property but awarded it entirely to Roland. The court interpreted the agreement to mean that Roland was obligated to pay Maryann $577 monthly for her share of the community asset, regardless of his decision to waive retirement pay for disability benefits. The court emphasized that Roland could not escape his contractual obligations by unilaterally choosing to forfeit his retirement pay.

The property settlement agreement between Roland and Maryann is ambiguous. The agreement states that Roland's military disability is community property, but it awards the entire amount to Roland.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, affirming that Roland must fulfill his contractual obligations to Maryann.

The district court's order is reversed and this matter is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

Maryann Shelton prevailed in the case because the court found that Roland was contractually obligated to continue payments to her despite his waiver of military retirement benefits.

The court then held that under USFSPA's 'plain and precise language, state courts have been granted the authority to treat disposable retired pay as community property; they have not been granted the authority to treat total retired pay [which includes disability pay] as community property.'

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