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Keywords

defendantliabilitysummary judgmentlease
defendantappealmotionsummary judgmentmotion for summary judgment

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Sheridan v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161

Facts

On March 5, 1958, the defendant, then serving as President of the Borough of Queens, submitted a report to the Mayor regarding the city's acquisition of real property through condemnation. This report included critical statements about the city's appraiser, which were later published in various newspapers. The defendant's report was made available to the press three months after its submission, leading to the libel action based on the allegedly defamatory statements contained within it.

On or about March 5, 1958, defendant, then serving as President of the Borough of Queens and as a member of the Board of Estimate of the City of New York, submitted a report to the Mayor, copies of which eventually also were delivered to other members of the board, concerning the city's acquisition by condemnation of real property located on the Rockaway Peninsula in Queens, known as Edgemere Park.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether the statements made by the borough president were absolutely privileged, whether they were qualifiedly privileged, and whether the defendant was immune from liability for libel.

The initial question is whether, under the circumstances here, defendant is to be accorded an absolute privilege.

Rule

The court applied the principle that an executive official is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter in the exercise of their official function if the matter relates to the executive proceeding in which the official is acting.

Under Federal decisions, it has long been held that an executive official is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another in the exercise of his executive function if the matter has some relation to the executive proceeding in which the official is acting.

Analysis

The court found that the borough president acted within the scope of his official duties when he investigated the condemnation proceeding and made the report. The statements made were deemed to concern a matter of public interest, and the release of the report to the press was within the bounds of absolute privilege. The court emphasized that the privilege applies regardless of the truth or malice behind the statements.

Thus a Borough President acting within the scope of his official powers must be accorded the protection of absolute privilege.

Conclusion

The court reversed the lower courts' orders and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the statements were absolutely privileged.

The order appealed from should be reversed, and defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint granted.

Who won?

The defendant, the Borough President of Queens, prevailed because the court determined that he was entitled to absolute privilege for the statements made in the course of his official duties.

The absolute privilege to which defendant is entitled is a complete bar to this action in libel, regardless of whether the publication was motivated by malice or that the matter so published was false and defamatory.

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