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Keywords

tortplaintiffdefendantdamagesnegligenceliabilitytrialwillstrict liabilitycontributory negligencejury instructions
tortplaintiffdamagesnegligenceliabilitytrialadoptionstrict liabilitycontributory negligenceappellantjury trial

Related Cases

Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857

Facts

In 1965, Shields, a seed bean wholesaler, sought a new pesticide-fungicide and was recommended by Brown, a distributor, to use Panodrin A-13 with a Panogen MC-R treater, both manufactured by Morton Chemical. Shields applied the chemical at a higher rate than recommended, leading to issues with germination in treated beans sent to Mexico. An expert later determined that all treated beans were unsuitable for sale, prompting Shields to sue for damages based on negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability after a jury ruled in favor of the defendants.

The evidence presented at the trial was hotly controverted and involved the traditional battle of experts. Plaintiff-appellant Shields contends that the evidence established the following facts: In 1965, Shields, a seed bean wholesaler in Twin Falls County, was desirous of obtaining a new pesticide-fungicide to apply to seed beans.

Issue

The main legal questions were whether Idaho should adopt strict liability in products liability cases and whether contributory negligence is a valid defense against strict liability claims.

The principal questions presented are whether Idaho has adopted or should now adopt the principle of strict liability in products liability cases, and whether contributory negligence is a defense to the doctrine of strict liability.

Rule

The court adopted the doctrine of strict liability as outlined in the Restatement of the Law, Torts Second, stating that contributory negligence, in the sense of failing to discover a defect, is not a defense to strict liability.

1 An examination of what appear to us to be the better reasoned cases leads us today to the adoption of the rule of strict liability in tort as it appears in The Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, s 402A (1965): ‘(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if…’

Analysis

The court determined that the trial court's instructions on contributory negligence were misleading, as they did not clarify that this defense applied only to the negligence theory and not to the theories of breach of warranty or strict liability. The court emphasized that strict liability should be recognized in Idaho and that contributory negligence should not bar recovery in cases where the plaintiff's negligence was merely a failure to discover a defect.

Following a two week jury trial involving highly complex issues of products liability and not having had the benefit of this court's new theories of strict liability in tort and the extent to which contributory negligence is a defense thereto, it it not surprising that the trial court in Jury Instruction 34 failed to expressly limit contributory negligence and to make it inapplicable to Shields' theories of breach of warranty and strict liability.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, emphasizing the need for clear jury instructions regarding the applicability of contributory negligence to different legal theories.

Judgment of the district court is reversed and remanded for a new trial. Costs to appellant.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the chemical company, as the jury initially ruled in their favor. However, the Supreme Court's reversal indicates that the case will be retried under the new legal standards.

The principal contention of the appellant is that the trial court erred in giving Instruction 34 on contributory negligence, which states: ‘Contributory negligence is negligence on the part of a person claiming damages, which, cooperating with the negligence of another, helps in proximately causing the injury of which the foremer (sic) thereafter complains.’

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