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Shinal v. Toms, 640 Pa. 295, 162 A.3d 429

Facts

Megan L. Shinal underwent surgery to remove a recurrent non-malignant brain tumor after a previous surgery had left residual tumor. During her initial consultation, Dr. Toms discussed the risks and benefits of surgery with her, but the details of the conversation were unclear. After a series of communications with Dr. Toms' physician assistant, Mrs. Shinal signed an informed consent form. However, she later claimed that she was not adequately informed of the risks and alternatives to the surgery, which ultimately resulted in severe complications.

On November 26, 2007, Megan L. Shinal and Dr. Toms met for a twenty-minute initial consultation to discuss removing a recurrent non-malignant tumor from the pituitary region of Mrs. Shinal's brain.

Issue

Did the trial court err in refusing to strike prospective jurors for cause based on their relationships with the surgeon's employer, and did it err in instructing the jury that they could consider information provided by the surgeon's staff in determining informed consent?

The first issue before us is whether the Shinals were entitled to strike for cause prospective jurors with familial, situational, or financial relationships with Dr. Toms' employer, whether direct or indirect, when Dr. Toms' allegedly tortious conduct occurred in the course of his employment.

Rule

A physician's duty to provide sufficient information to obtain informed consent is non-delegable, and jurors should be disqualified for cause if they have a close familial, financial, or situational relationship with a party involved in the litigation.

A physician's duty to provide information to a patient sufficient to obtain her informed consent is non-delegable.

Analysis

The court found that the trial court did not err in its decision regarding juror disqualification, as the relationships presented were not sufficiently close to presume prejudice. However, the court determined that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider information from the surgeon's staff regarding informed consent, as this duty rests solely with the surgeon.

However, we conclude further that the trial court committed an error of law when it instructed the jury to consider information provided by the defendant surgeon's qualified staff in deciding the merits of the informed consent claim.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of the surgeon and remanded the case for a new trial, emphasizing the non-delegable nature of the surgeon's duty to obtain informed consent.

Because a physician's duty to provide information to a patient sufficient to obtain her informed consent is non-delegable, we reverse the Superior Court's order affirming the judgment entered in favor of the defendant, and we remand for a new trial.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the surgeon, Dr. Toms, as the jury initially ruled in his favor. However, the Supreme Court's reversal means that the case will be retried.

The Superior Court rejected this argument. The Superior Court observed that the Shinals' argument was premised upon Cordes, and that the trial court endeavored to comply with Cordes during jury selection.

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