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Keywords

precedentappealfelony
statuteprecedentpleafelony

Related Cases

Shuti v. Lynch

Facts

Altin Bashkim Shuti, an Albanian national, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 2008. In 2014, he was convicted of felony unarmed robbery under Michigan law, which led to the Department of Homeland Security initiating removal proceedings against him. The Board of Immigration Appeals determined that his conviction was an aggravated felony, categorizing it as a crime of violence, which rendered him ineligible for discretionary relief from removal.

Petitioner [**2] Altin Bashkim Shuti, who hails from Albania, entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in October 2008. He was 13 years old when his parents, who are now American citizens, decided to flee their home-country for fear of persecution at the hands of the Albanian Socialist Party. Nearly six years later, in May 2014, Shuti and a few of his high-school cohorts allegedly committed a 'larceny of marijuana' and 'in the course of that conduct possessed a shotgun.' Shuti pleaded guilty, for his part, to the lesser offense of felony unarmed robbery, defined under Michigan law as 'larceny of any money or other property' accomplished by using 'force or violence against any person who is present' or 'assault[ing] or put[ting] the person in fear.' Mich. Comp. Laws 750.530.

Issue

Is the Immigration and Nationality Act's definition of 'crime of violence' unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment?

One constitutional question is presented here: is the INA's definition of 'crime of violence,' 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), in combination with the criminal statute…

Rule

The court applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which prohibits laws that fail to provide fair notice of the conduct they punish or that invite arbitrary enforcement.

The court applied the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which prohibits laws that fail to provide fair notice of the conduct they punish or that invite arbitrary enforcement.

Analysis

The court found that the Immigration and Nationality Act's residual clause defining 'crime of violence' was similar to the Armed Career Criminal Act's definition struck down in Johnson. The court emphasized that the vagueness arises from the requirement to assess the risk posed by a crime based on an 'ordinary case' rather than real-world facts, leading to unpredictability and arbitrary enforcement.

The court found that the Immigration and Nationality Act's residual clause defining 'crime of violence' was similar to the Armed Career Criminal Act's definition struck down in Johnson. The court emphasized that the vagueness arises from the requirement to assess the risk posed by a crime based on an 'ordinary case' rather than real-world facts, leading to unpredictability and arbitrary enforcement.

Conclusion

The court granted Shuti's petition for review, vacated the order of removal, and concluded that the definition of 'crime of violence' in the INA is void for vagueness.

We now grant Shuti's petition for review as to the 'constitutional claim[],' 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D), and vacate the order of removal.

Who won?

Shuti prevailed in the case because the court found the definition of 'crime of violence' in the INA to be unconstitutionally vague, aligning with the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Johnson.

Shuti prevailed in the case because the court found the definition of 'crime of violence' in the INA to be unconstitutionally vague, aligning with the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Johnson.

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