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Keywords

statutefelonyvisa

statuteprecedentvisa

Related Cases

Sijapati v. Boente

Facts

Ashish Sijapati, a native and citizen of Nepal, was admitted to the U.S. on an L-2 visa on January 25, 2001. After a brief vacation, he reentered the U.S. on January 18, 2003. He was later convicted of felony embezzlement on December 12, 2007, which was within five years of his most recent admission. The BIA found him removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the INA for committing a crime involving moral turpitude within that timeframe.

Sijapati first entered and was admitted to the United States on a nonimmigrant L-2 visa on January 25, 2001. On December 31, 2002, Sijapati departed the United States for a two-and-a-half week vacation to Nepal, reentering the United States on January 18, 2003, pursuant to his existing L-2 visa. On March 16, 2005, federal immigration officials approved Sijapati's application for adjustment of status as a lawful permanent resident.

Issue

Whether the BIA correctly interpreted 'the date of admission' in Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to determine Sijapati's removability.

Sijapati argues that the BIA erred in finding him removable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) because his conviction on December 12, 2007, of a crime involving moral turpitude occurred more than five years after he was first admitted to the United States on January 25, 2001.

Rule

The BIA's interpretation of ambiguous statutory terms is entitled to Chevron deference, meaning it must be upheld unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.

'Matters of statutory construction present questions of law, which we generally review de novo.' Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 2012). However, when called upon to review the BIA's interpretation of a provision in the INA, we must keep in mind that we are 'reviewing the considered judgment of the federal agency charged with interpreting and administering the statute at issue in this case.' Nwolise v. INS, 4 F.3d 306, 309 (4th Cir. 1993).

Analysis

The court applied Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretation, concluding that the phrase 'the date of admission' refers to the date by which the alien was present in the U.S. when committing the crime. The BIA's decision in Matter of Alyazji was deemed a reasonable interpretation of the statute, as it focused on the admission that allowed the alien's presence at the time of the offense.

In reviewing the BIA's interpretation under the second prong of Chevron, '[w]e generally give substantial deference to the BIA's precedential decisions interpreting the INA, because 'Congress conferred on the BIA decisionmaking power to decide such questions of law.'" Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512, 518 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Martinez, 740 F.3d at 909).

Conclusion

The court affirmed the BIA's decision, denying Sijapati's petition for review and upholding his removability based on the interpretation of 'the date of admission.'

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case as the court upheld the BIA's interpretation of the statute, which found Sijapati removable due to his conviction within the relevant timeframe.

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