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Keywords

attorneystatuteappealfelonynaturalization
attorneystatuteprecedentfelonynaturalizationliens

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Silva- Trevino v. Holder

Facts

Silva-Trevino was subject to removal proceedings under the Immigration and Naturalization Act after being convicted of an aggravated felony, specifically indecency with a child under Texas law. He sought an adjustment of status to avoid removal, but the immigration judge ruled that his conviction qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude, making him inadmissible. The Board of Immigration Appeals initially vacated this decision, but the Attorney General later certified the case for review, introducing a new method for determining moral turpitude that included extrinsic evidence.

This case arises out of proceedings to remove Silva-Trevino pursuant to 237 of the INA, which permits the removal of aliens convicted of an aggravated felony. Silva-Trevino concedes that he has been convicted of an aggravated felony (indecency with a child, 21.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code), but he seeks an adjustment of status under 245(a), such that he might avoid removal.

Issue

Whether the Attorney General's method for determining if an alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, which allows consideration of extrinsic evidence, is consistent with the statutory language of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

The instant case requires us to decide whether the Attorney General's interpretation of the INA supersedes this Circuit's longstanding precedent.

Rule

The court applied a categorical approach to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude, limiting evidence to the formal record of conviction and not allowing extrinsic evidence.

We have long held that, in making this determination, judges may consider only 'the inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the statute,' or, in the case of divisible statutes, 'the alien's record of conviction.'

Analysis

The court analyzed the Attorney General's new method and found it inconsistent with the established categorical approach, which only permits consideration of the inherent nature of the crime as defined in the statute or the alien's record of conviction. The court emphasized that the statutory language does not allow for extrinsic evidence in determining moral turpitude, and thus the Attorney General's method was not permissible.

The court analyzed the Attorney General's new method and found it inconsistent with the established categorical approach, which only permits consideration of the inherent nature of the crime as defined in the statute or the alien's record of conviction.

Conclusion

The court granted Silva-Trevino's petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.

The court granted Silva-Trevino's petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.

Who won?

Cristoval Silva-Trevino prevailed in the case because the court found that the Attorney General's method of considering extrinsic evidence was inconsistent with the statutory language of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

Cristoval Silva-Trevino prevailed in the case because the court found that the Attorney General's method of considering extrinsic evidence was inconsistent with the statutory language of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

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