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Keywords

contractplaintiffdefendantdamagesverdictlease
contractplaintiffdefendantverdictwillleaseappellantappellee

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Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jones Super Service Station, 188 Ark. 1075, 70 S.W.2d 562

Facts

The plaintiffs owned a leasehold interest in a gasoline service station in Harrison, Arkansas, and signed a lease contract with the defendant on February 9, 1933. However, they later canceled the lease via telegram on March 17, 1933, which the defendant acknowledged on April 11, 1933. Despite this cancellation, the defendant continued to assert ownership of the lease to other companies, causing the plaintiffs to be denied gas and oil products for resale.

That on and prior to February 9, 1933, appellees owned a certain leasehold interest in and to a gasoline service station in Harrison, Ark., and on said date signed and acknowledged a certain lease contract in favor of appellant.

Issue

Did the defendant's actions constitute slander of title, and were the plaintiffs entitled to damages for the false claims made by the defendant?

Appellant asserts, and appellees deny, that the lease contract of date February 9, 1933, was a valid lease against the property in controversy, but we find it unnecessary to decide this question.

Rule

In an action for slander of title, it is essential that the plaintiff prove that the defendant acted maliciously in uttering the words in question. Malice may be inferred from the falsity of the statements if the defendant knew they were false.

The law in reference to slander of title is stated thus in 17 R. C. L. p. 456: 'In an action for slander of title, or for disparagement of goods or property, it is essential that the plaintiff prove that the defendant acted maliciously in uttering the words in question.'

Analysis

The court found that the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant acted with actual malice by knowingly making false claims of ownership after the lease had been canceled. The jury was justified in determining that these assertions were made to harm the plaintiffs' business, which constituted slander of title.

Moreover, the evidence in the instant case warranted the jury in finding actual malice. Appellant was engaged in the wholesale distribution of gas and oils in the vicinity of Harrison, where this controversy arose, and at the same time appellant had as competitors in this territory the Standard Oil Company, the Magnolia and Marathon Oil Companies.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, concluding that the defendant's claims were unfounded and malicious.

The court's instructions to the jury, submitting the questions of fact for their consideration, were in conformity to the views here expressed, and, since it is not contended that the verdict is excessive, the judgment will be affirmed.

Who won?

Jones Super Service Station prevailed in the case because the jury found that Sinclair Refining Company made false and malicious claims that harmed their business.

The jury was fully warranted in finding that these false assertions of ownership were communicated to the companies aforesaid by appellant for the specific purpose of injuring appellees' business, and that such was the result.

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