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Keywords

statuteprecedentfelonyimmigration law

appealnaturalization

Related Cases

Soto-Hernandez v. Holder

Facts

Jose Demetrio Soto-Hernandez, a native of the Dominican Republic, entered the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1996. He was convicted in 2003 for assault and battery and later, in 2005, for unlawfully delivering a firearm without complying with state laws. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him, asserting that his conviction constituted an aggravated felony under immigration law, which led him to apply for cancellation of removal.

In June of 2005, around the same time that DHS instituted the removal proceedings, Soto was convicted of unlawfully delivering a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol to a purchaser 'without complying with' the Rhode Island General Laws.

Issue

Did the BIA err in defining 'trafficking in firearms' to include a one-time sale of a single firearm, and does the rule of lenity apply in this immigration context?

Soto's argument that 8 U.S.C.S. 1101(a)(43)(C)'s explicit reference to 'trafficking in firearms,' in the plural, precluded the BIA from applying the term to a one-time delivery of a single firearm was waived on appeal as he had failed to raise the argument before either the IJ or the BIA.

Rule

The BIA's interpretation of 'trafficking in firearms' as any commercial exchange is reasonable and consistent with the statute, and the rule of lenity does not apply to immigration statutes.

In light of the deference owed to the BIA's constructions of the INA, the rule of lenity could not apply to contravene the BIA's reasonable interpretation in the instant case.

Analysis

The court applied Chevron deference to the BIA's interpretation, concluding that the definition of trafficking included minimal involvement in commercial exchanges. The court noted that the BIA's reliance on dictionary definitions and its own precedent supported this interpretation. The court also found that the alien's argument regarding the plural form of 'firearms' was waived, as it was not raised in earlier proceedings.

The BIA acknowledged that 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(C) does not define 'trafficking' with regard to firearms. It noted, however, that Matter of Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536 (BIA 1992), an earlier case that addressed the same term in a consecutive provision of the INA dealing with controlled substances, had construed 'traffic' pursuant to Black's Law Dictionary as 'commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the like' and trafficking as 'trading or dealing in certain goods.'

Conclusion

The court denied Soto's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision that his conviction constituted an aggravated felony under immigration law.

Because the BIA's determination involved a permissible construction of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), we deny the petition for review.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the BIA's interpretation of trafficking and denied Soto's petition for review.

The BIA's construction is a permissible interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(C).

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