Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

plaintiffattorneystatuteappealtrialdivorcelegal aid
plaintiffattorneytrialdivorcelegal aidappellantappellee

Related Cases

Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or. 221, 851 P.2d 556
View Case »
Troice v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 816 F.3d 341
View Case »
State v. Berrysmith, 87 Wash.App. 268, 944 P.2d 397
View Case »
United States v. Wheat, 988 F.3d 299
View Case »
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

Spees v. Kentucky Legal Aid, 274 S.W.3d 447

Facts

Attorney Stanley K. Spees was appointed as a warning order attorney in a divorce case for Esmeralda Marie Vasquez-Orosco, who was granted in forma pauperis status due to her indigency. After fulfilling his duties, Spees requested a fee of $150.00 to be paid by Vasquez-Orosco or her employer, Kentucky Legal Aid. The McCracken Family Court denied the request, citing her indigent status and the lack of funds from the Commonwealth of Kentucky to cover the fee. The Court of Appeals dismissed Spees' claim against Kentucky Legal Aid and affirmed the denial of the fee.

Appellant, Stanley K. Spees, is an attorney, who in October of 2004 was appointed warning order attorney in a divorce action brought in the McCracken Family Court by Appellee, Esmeralda Marie Vasquez–Orosco.

Issue

Whether the warning order attorney fee can be assessed against an indigent plaintiff who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, and whether Kentucky Legal Aid can be held liable for that fee.

The critical distinction between the instant case and Boddie and Francis is that Appellee has never been denied access to the court, nor has the adjudication of her divorce case been impeded or impaired by a demand for payment of fees.

Rule

KRS 453.060(2) mandates that a warning order attorney shall be allowed a reasonable fee for services, to be paid by the plaintiff and taxed as costs, while KRS 453.190(1) allows indigent persons to file actions without paying costs.

KRS 453.060(2) provides: A guardian ad litem or warning order attorney shall be allowed by the court a reasonable fee for his services, to be paid by the plaintiff and taxed as costs.

Analysis

The court analyzed the conflict between KRS 453.060(2) and KRS 453.190(1), concluding that the specific statute regarding warning order attorney fees takes precedence over the general provision for indigent litigants. The court emphasized that the indigent plaintiff had not been denied access to the courts, and thus the requirement to pay the warning order attorney fee did not infringe upon her rights. The court found that the trial court erred in denying the fee and that it could be assessed against the plaintiff without impeding her access to the court.

The direct mandate of KRS 453.060 with respect to payments of warning order attorney fees is more specific than the general reference of KRS 453.190(1) to 'all needful services and process' and 'all officers.'

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Kentucky Legal Aid as a party but reversed the denial of the warning order attorney fee, remanding the case for further proceedings to determine the fee's payment.

Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred when it declined to allow Appellant a fee for his services and that it erred when it failed to direct the payment of same by Appellee.

Who won?

The prevailing party is Stanley K. Spees, as the court ruled in his favor regarding the entitlement to the warning order attorney fee.

The Supreme Court, Venters, J., held that: 1 legal aid organization as employer of attorney for in forma pauperis case was not liable for warning order attorney fee.

You must be