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Keywords

defendantstatutewill

defendantjurisdictionstatuteappealwill

Related Cases

State v. Boies, 68 Kan. 167, 74 P. 630

Facts

Blanche Boies was charged with malicious trespass for breaking the plate glass in the doors and windows of a building used as a cigar store. The incident occurred on February 14, 1903, in Topeka, Kansas. The defendant attempted to argue that her actions were not malicious because she believed the premises were being used for illegal liquor sales, but the court rejected this defense. The prosecution's evidence showed that Boies intentionally damaged the property.

The information charged: 'That Blanche Boies, at the county of Shawnee, in the state of Kansas aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this court, on the 14th day of February, A. D. 1903, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and maliciously break, destroy, and injure the doors and windows to a certain building of one Sophia Hogaboom and in the possession of H. A. Uterman…'

Issue

The main legal issue was whether the term 'malicious' in the statute required proof of ill will towards the property owner or if it could be interpreted more broadly.

This is the sole issue presented by the appeal.

Rule

The court held that the term 'malicious' in the context of the Crimes Act is to be interpreted in its general sense, meaning wrongful and intentional, without the necessity of proving malice against the property owner.

The word 'malicious,' as used in section 107 of the Crimes Act (section 2100, Gen. St. 1901), directed against the unlawful destruction of the property of another, in view of the provisions of section 112 (section 2105, Gen. St. 1901), is to receive the construction usually given it in criminal statutes, and in a prosecution thereunder it is no defense to show that the defendant was not actuated by any actual ill will toward the owner or any other person.

Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory language and its historical context, concluding that the Kansas statute was designed to eliminate the requirement of proving malice against the owner. The court referenced section 112 of the Crimes Act, which states that malice can be directed against the property or otherwise, thus broadening the interpretation of 'malicious' to include any intentional act that results in property damage.

Upon the authority of these decisions it is said in the American & English Encyclopedia of Law (2d Ed.) vol. 19, p. 643, note 1: 'Under the express provisions of the later English statutes it is immaterial whether or not the offense is committed from malice against the owner of the property; the willful doing of an intentional act is sufficient to warrant a conviction.'

Conclusion

The court affirmed the conviction of Blanche Boies for malicious trespass, ruling that the evidence supported the finding of malice as defined by the statute.

The judgment is affirmed.

Who won?

The State prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the conviction based on the interpretation of 'malicious' that did not require proof of ill will towards the property owner.

The state contends for the former construction, the defendant for the latter.

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