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Keywords

plaintiffdefendantstatuteappealtrialmotionsummary judgmentcivil procedurelegislative intentmotion for summary judgment
plaintiffstatuteappealmotioncivil procedurelegislative intent

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Steed v. Imperial Airlines, 12 Cal.3d 115, 524 P.2d 801, 115 Cal.Rptr. 329, 68 A.L.R.3d 1204

Facts

Elizabeth Ann Steed, a minor, appealed a judgment for defendants entered by the trial court after it granted their motion for summary judgment in a wrongful death action concerning her stepfather, Ronald Steed. The parties stipulated to the relevant facts, which focused solely on Elizabeth's status as a proper plaintiff under the wrongful death statute. The court noted that the statute at the time of the alleged cause of action limited the right to bring such actions to 'heirs' and 'personal representatives' of the deceased, and that Elizabeth, although treated as a natural child, was not formally adopted by Ronald.

For purposes of the motion the parties stipulated to the factual matters which are pertinent to the issue of Elizabeth's status as a proper plaintiff under the statute.

Issue

Whether a stepchild, treated in all respects as a natural child but not formally adopted, may maintain an action for the wrongful death of the stepparent under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.

The single issue raised on this appeal is whether a stepchild, treated in all respects as the natural child but not formally adopted by the deceased stepfather, may maintain an action for the wrongful death of the stepparent under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.

Rule

The right to bring an action for wrongful death is limited to those described in Code of Civil Procedure section 377, which has been interpreted to include only those who would inherit from the decedent's estate had he died intestate.

It is well settled that the right to bring an action for the wrongful death of a human being is limited to the persons described in Code of Civil Procedure section 377.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by examining the legislative intent behind the wrongful death statute, concluding that the term 'heirs' was narrowly defined to exclude dependent stepchildren like Elizabeth. The court emphasized that the statute's limitations were a clear expression of legislative intent and that it could not extend the definition of 'heirs' to include Elizabeth, despite her close relationship with Ronald.

In our view the limitation on those who may bring the action is one which is imposed by the Legislature and, absent a constitutional basis for departure from a clear expression of legislative intent, we are bound thereby.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that Elizabeth did not qualify as a proper plaintiff under the wrongful death statute.

We accordingly reject as untenable any rationale which substitutes our own for a legislative judgment when it infringes no constitutional limitation.

Who won?

Defendants prevailed in the case because the court found that Elizabeth did not meet the statutory definition of an 'heir' entitled to bring a wrongful death action.

The judgment is affirmed.

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