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defendantnegligencestatuteappealtriallegislative intentrespondent
defendantnegligencestatuteappealcommon lawrespondent

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Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303

Facts

Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Miller, were involved in an automobile accident allegedly caused by petitioners' negligence while Mrs. Miller was seven months pregnant. Following the accident, their child was stillborn, and the Millers contended that the unborn child was viable at the time of the accident and would have survived but for the negligence of the defendants. They brought an action for wrongful death under Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1973).

Respondents, Mr. and Mrs. Miller, were involved in an automobile accident allegedly caused by petitioners' negligence. At the time of the accident, Mrs. Miller was seven months pregnant. Her child was subsequently stillborn.

Issue

Whether an unborn, viable child killed as a direct and proximate result of another's negligence, is a 'person' within the intent of Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1973)?

1. Whether an unborn, viable child killed as a direct and proximate result of another's negligence, is a “person” within the intent of Section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1973)?

Rule

A wrongful death action is a creature of statute, and the term 'person' as used in the Wrongful Death Act does not include a viable fetus.

A wrongful death action is a creature of statute, unknown to the common law.

Analysis

The court analyzed the legislative intent behind the Wrongful Death Act and previous judicial interpretations, concluding that the legislature did not intend to include a viable fetus within the definition of 'person.' The court referenced past cases and the historical context of wrongful death statutes, emphasizing that the legislature's failure to explicitly include viable fetuses in the statute indicated a deliberate choice.

We address this question for the first time. In Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 213 So.2d 695 (Fla.1968), we were called upon to determine whether a stillborn fetus, prenatally injured by another's negligence, was a “minor child” under Florida's former Wrongful Death of Minors Act, Section 768.03, Florida Statutes (now repealed).

Conclusion

The Supreme Court quashed the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal and held that a viable fetus is not a 'person' for purposes of the Wrongful Death Act, thereby affirming the trial court's dismissal of the claim.

Accordingly, the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal is quashed and the matter remanded for action consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

The defendants prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court ruled that a viable fetus does not qualify as a 'person' under the Wrongful Death Act, aligning with the trial court's original dismissal.

The Supreme Court ultimately held that a fetus, which was alleged to have been viable and to have been fatally injured by defendant's negligence, was not a “person” for purposes of Wrongful Death Act.

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