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Keywords

jurisdictionappealtrialhabeas corpus

Related Cases

Stewart; U.S. v.

Facts

On October 31, 1994, a Washington jury convicted petitioner Lonnie Burton of rape, robbery, and burglary. The state trial court initially entered judgment and sentenced Burton to a total of 562 months in prison. The trial court justified the sentence on the ground that running the three terms concurrently would result in a sentence 'clearly too lenient' in light of the purposes of Washington's sentencing scheme. After an unrelated prior conviction was overturned, Burton requested resentencing, leading to an amended judgment and sentence, which was upheld on direct review.

On October 31, 1994, a Washington jury convicted petitioner Lonnie Burton of rape, robbery, and burglary. The state trial court initially entered judgment and sentence on December 19, 1994 (1994 judgment).

Issue

Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington announced a new rule and, if so, whether it applies retroactively on collateral review.

We granted certiorari in this case, 547 U.S. 1178, 126 S. Ct. 2352, 165 L. Ed. 2d 278 (2006), to determine whether our decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), announced a new rule and, if so, whether it applies retroactively on collateral review.

Rule

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a stringent set of procedures that a prisoner must follow if he wishes to file a 'second or successive' habeas corpus application challenging that custody, requiring authorization from the appropriate court of appeals before filing.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a stringent set of procedures that a prisoner 'in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,' 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), must follow if he wishes to file a 'second or successive' habeas corpus application challenging that custody, 2244(b)(1).

Analysis

The Supreme Court concluded that Burton's 2002 petition was a 'second or successive' petition that he did not seek or obtain authorization to file. The Court noted that Burton had previously filed a habeas petition in 1998 and that he was still in custody under the same judgment when he filed the 2002 petition. Therefore, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 2002 petition.

We conclude, though, that because the 2002 petition is a 'second or successive' petition that Burton did not seek or obtain authorization to file in the District Court, the District Court never had jurisdiction to consider it in the first place.

Conclusion

The judgment affirming the denial of the inmate's habeas corpus petition was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions to direct the district court to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to direct the District Court to dismiss petitioner's habeas corpus application for lack of jurisdiction.

Who won?

The State prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Burton's claims due to his failure to comply with the gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2244.

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