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Keywords

plaintiffstatutemotiondue process
plaintiffdefendantstatutemotion

Related Cases

Summit County Democratic Cent. and Executive Committee v. Blackwell, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2004 WL 5550698

Facts

The plaintiffs, including the Summit County Democratic Central and Executive Committee and individual voters, filed a Verified Complaint and Motion for TRO against various Ohio election officials, arguing that Ohio Revised Code § 3505.20 allowed for potential voter challenges that could violate their constitutional rights. The statute permitted appointed challengers to question voters' qualifications at polling places, which the plaintiffs claimed would lead to voter intimidation and a denial of due process. The court held a telephonic conference to discuss the motion, considering the urgency due to the upcoming election.

Plaintiffs are: the Summit County Democratic Central and Executive Committee; Marco Sommerville; Karen Doty; Timothy Gorbach; James B. McCarthy; Jane Doe Citizens of the United States and Residents of Ohio Nos. 1 through 20; and John Doe Citizens of the United States and Ohio Nos. 1 through 20.

Issue

Whether the provisions of Ohio Revised Code § 3505.20, which allow appointed challengers to be present at polling places to challenge voter qualifications, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.

Specifically, the Court finds that persons appointed as challengers under Ohio Revised Code § 3505.20 may not be present at Ohio's polling places on November 2, 2004 for the sole purpose of challenging the qualifications of other voters.

Rule

The court applied the legal standard for granting a temporary restraining order, which includes assessing the likelihood of success on the merits, potential irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and the public interest.

When deciding whether preliminary injunctive relief should issue, the Court considers four factors: (1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of preliminary injunctive relief would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of preliminary injunctive relief.

Analysis

The court determined that the presence of challengers at polling places could severely burden the fundamental right to vote, leading to potential voter intimidation and chaos during the election process. The court found that while the state has a compelling interest in preventing voter fraud, the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest, as election judges could already challenge voter qualifications without the need for additional challengers.

The Court must next identify and evaluate the precise interest asserted by Defendants to justify the burden imposed by the statute. Defendants argue that the presence of challengers at the polls is necessary to safeguard against voter fraud and to ensure the integrity of the voting process.

Conclusion

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part, prohibiting appointed challengers from being present at polling places for the purpose of challenging voter qualifications during the November 2, 2004 election, while denying other requests for relief.

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' Motion for TRO is granted in part and denied in part.

Who won?

The plaintiffs prevailed in part, as the court ruled that the presence of appointed challengers at polling places would likely infringe on voters' constitutional rights.

The Court indicated, at the telephonic conference, that the deadline for filing oppositions to the TRO would be 4:00 p.m. on October 29, 2004.

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