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Keywords

lawsuitdefendantdamagesstatuteappealtrialsummary judgment
damagesstatutetrialsummary judgmentcommon law

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Tait v. Wahl, 97 Wash.App. 765, 987 P.2d 127

Facts

Mary Douglas raised her niece, Amber Tait, and supported her children. On March 1, 1991, Douglas was struck and killed by a delivery truck driven by Theodore Wahl. Tait, as Douglas's personal representative, filed a lawsuit on March 1, 1994, seeking damages for various claims on behalf of herself, her children, Douglas's brother, and Douglas's estate. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, leading to the dismissal of all claims brought by Tait and her family.

For purposes of summary judgment, the substantive facts *768 are not in dispute. Mary Douglas raised her niece, Amber Tait, as if she were her own child, and then helped Tait raise her children, Kindra, Shea, and Tyler, with financial and personal support. On March 1, 1991, Theodore Wahl struck and killed Douglas with his delivery truck. On March 1, 1994, Tait, as Douglas's personal representative, sued Wahl and others on behalf of herself, her three children, Douglas's brother, and Douglas's estate, seeking damages for pain and suffering, medical and other out-of-pocket expenses, impairment of income and earning capacity, loss of enjoyment of life, and loss of consortium.

Issue

Whether Tait, her children, and Douglas's non-dependent brother are beneficiaries under Washington's wrongful death and survival statutes, and whether the decedent's estate can recover noneconomic damages.

Because Tait, her children, and the decedent's non-dependent brother are not beneficiaries under Washington's wrongful death and survival statutes, RCW 4.20.010, -.020, -.046(1), -.060, and the common law does not recognize a cause of action against a person who wrongfully causes the death of another, the trial court properly dismissed, on summary judgment, the claims that Tait brought on behalf of herself, her children, and the decedent's non-dependant brother.

Rule

Washington's wrongful death statute limits beneficiaries to the spouse and children of the deceased, with parents and siblings only able to recover if there are no first-tier beneficiaries and if they were dependent on the deceased. The general survival statute does not allow recovery for noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life.

The wrongful death statute, however, is expressly limited to two tiers of beneficiaries: The first tier of beneficiaries includes the spouse and children of the deceased; these beneficiaries need not establish dependence on the deceased. The second tier of beneficiaries, which includes the parents and siblings of the deceased, may recover only if there are no first tier beneficiaries and only if the designated beneficiaries were dependent for support on the deceased.

Analysis

The court found that Tait, her children, and Douglas's brother did not qualify as beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute because Douglas had no legal spouse or children, and the brother was not financially dependent on her. The court also ruled that the estate could not recover noneconomic damages under the survival statute, as these damages are not assets that can be accumulated by the decedent.

In this case, it is undisputed that the decedent had no legal spouse or children. In addition, although the decedent had a surviving brother, George Harding Douglas, it is undisputed that he was not financially dependent on the decedent. Therefore, strictly construing the statute, Tait, her children, and George Douglas are not among the beneficiaries on whose behalf the decedent's personal representative can maintain a cause of action under RCW 4.20.010, even though it is also undisputed that Tait and her children were financially dependent upon the decedent.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the claims, concluding that Tait and her family were not statutory beneficiaries and that the estate could not recover noneconomic damages.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Who won?

The defendants prevailed in the case because the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of all claims, confirming that Tait and her family were not beneficiaries under the applicable statutes.

The trial court properly dismissed, on summary judgment, the claims that Tait brought on behalf of herself, her children, and the decedent's non-dependant brother.

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