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contracttrialwill

contractplaintiffwill

Related Cases

Taylor v. Wilder, 63 Colo. 282, 165 P. 766

Facts

Dillie S. Aldrich executed a will and a written instrument transferring her library to Ozetta Marshall, who later claimed ownership of additional personal property after Aldrich's death. The claim was based on the alleged bill of sale and a sworn statement of indebtedness totaling $2,829.68, which included various personal items and cash held in banks. The county court initially allowed the claim, but this judgment was annulled, leading to the trial in the district court.

The claim of plaintiff in error, who before her marriage was Ozetta Marshall, is based upon the aforesaid alleged bill of sale or instrument in writing, and was presented to the county court, together with a sworn statement of indebtedness in the total sum of $2,829.68, represented by personal property held by deceased at the time of her death.

Issue

The main legal issue was whether the writing executed by Dillie S. Aldrich constituted a valid contract transferring ownership of the personal property to Ozetta Marshall or if it was merely testamentary in nature.

1. Under this proposition it is essential to determine whether the writing in question is in reality a contract or only testamentary in character, or in part the one, and in part the other.

Rule

The legal character of instruments like the one in question depends on the maker's intent regarding whether ownership should pass before death or only upon death. If the intention is to convey a present estate, it is a deed; if it is to take effect only after death, it is a will.

It is elementary that the legal character of instruments of this kind depends upon whether the maker intended that ownership or interest should before his death pass from himself and vest in the other party upon the execution of the paper, or whether such ownership or estate should pass only upon his death.

Analysis

The court analyzed the writing executed by Aldrich and determined that it intended to pass ownership of the library immediately while the other property was to pass only upon her death. The court concluded that the second clause of the instrument was testamentary in character and not valid as a will due to improper execution.

Examining the instrument here involved, we are certain that the maker thereof intended that it should be effective immediately in passing ownership of the library, and, as to all other property therein mentioned, not until her death.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Ozetta Marshall Taylor was entitled to no judgment based on the writing and the stipulation regarding the claim.

The judgment will therefore be affirmed; and it is so ordered.

Who won?

Gertie B. Wilder and others prevailed in the case because the court found that the writing did not validly transfer ownership of the personal property to Ozetta Marshall Taylor.

The judgment was for the value of the items first mentioned, consisting of household goods, etc.

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