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Tejwani, Matter of

Facts

Jung Hee Jang, a native and citizen of South Korea, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1995 and later pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree money laundering in 2014. Following her conviction, the Department of Homeland Security charged her with removability due to her illegal entry. Jang sought cancellation of removal, but an immigration judge ruled her conviction was a CIMT, making her ineligible for relief. The BIA upheld this decision, leading Jang to petition for review.

Jang entered the United States without inspection in 1995. She is now a single parent and the sole provider for her U.S.-citizen daughter. In 2014, she pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to attempted money laundering in the second degree under N.Y. Penal Law 110 and 470.15(1)(b)(ii)(A). Days later, the Department of Homeland Security served Jang with a Notice to Appear, charging her as removable for having entered the United States without inspection.

Issue

Did the BIA err in determining that Jang's conviction for second-degree money laundering constituted a crime involving moral turpitude?

Did the BIA err by relying on its 2007 decision in In re Tejwani, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 99, which involved a second-degree money-laundering conviction based on conduct that occurred sometime before April 2000?

Rule

A crime involving moral turpitude requires a culpable mental state that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, which is not satisfied by mere knowledge of a crime or concealment of criminal proceeds.

The INA provides that 'any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense)' is ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Analysis

The court analyzed the elements of Jang's conviction under N.Y. Penal Law 470.15(1)(b)(ii)(A) and concluded that it does not require the evil intent necessary to classify as a CIMT. The statute only requires knowledge that the financial transaction is designed to conceal or disguise the proceeds of specified criminal conduct, which falls short of the depravity required for a CIMT. Therefore, the BIA's reliance on its previous decision in In re Tejwani was misplaced.

The BIA's reliance on 470.10(1) to determine that Jang's crime was a CIMT was indisputably misplaced, either as a reference to the Tejwani provision that had been superseded by 470.15(1)(b)(ii)(A) before Jang's offense conduct, or as a reference to the current 470.10(1) (McKinney 2009), which defines money laundering in the third, not second, degree.

Conclusion

The court granted Jang's petition for review and remanded the case to the agency for further consideration of her application for cancellation of removal.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to the agency for further consideration of Jang's application.

Who won?

Jung Hee Jang prevailed because the court found that her conviction did not meet the criteria for a CIMT, which was the basis for the BIA's denial of her application for cancellation of removal.

Jung Hee Jang prevailed because the court found that her conviction did not meet the criteria for a CIMT, which was the basis for the BIA's denial of her application for cancellation of removal.

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