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Keywords

appealtestimonydivorceadmissibility

defendantattorneytestimonywilldivorce

Related Cases

Tennessee Bar Ass’n v. Freemon, 50 Tenn.App. 567, 362 S.W.2d 828

Facts

The Tennessee Bar Association initiated disbarment proceedings against Howard P. Freemon, alleging misconduct in the Spinks divorce case and the Whitehead cases. In the Spinks case, Freemon was accused of entrapping Mrs. Spinks into committing adultery while representing her husband. In the Whitehead cases, he was charged with making slanderous remarks about opposing counsel. The Chancellor found both charges substantiated and ruled for permanent disbarment, which Freemon appealed.

This action was instituted by the Tennessee Bar Association on July 7, 1959, seeking the permanent disbarment of defendant Howard P. Freemon for alleged misconduct growing out of what will be herein referred to as the Spinks divorce case and the Whitehead cases.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether the evidence presented was sufficient to justify disbarment and whether the Chancellor erred in admitting certain testimony as substantive evidence against Freemon.

The important question, however, is whether defendant was aware that Mrs. Spinks had been entrapped.

Rule

The court applied the principle that the same rules of evidence applicable in other judicial proceedings also govern disbarment proceedings, requiring clear evidence of misconduct.

It is therefore the holding of this court that the finding in a civil action that an attorney at law has been guilty of conduct justifying disbarment is not conclusive on the same question when presented for determination in an action for disbarment; that notwithstanding the finding in the civil action the culpability of the attorney must be established in the disbarment action by a clear preponderance of the evidence.

Analysis

The court analyzed the admissibility of testimony from the Spinks divorce case, concluding that it was improperly admitted as substantive evidence against Freemon. The court emphasized that without this testimony, the remaining evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate Freemon's intentional participation in the alleged entrapment. However, the court acknowledged that Freemon's actions, including spying on Mrs. Spinks and taking compromising photographs, constituted gross professional impropriety.

We think it was proper to file in this case the testimony of Mrs. Spinks to show a state of facts which seemed to call for defendant to make some explanation of his action, we can not say defendant's failure to testify in the divorce case standing alone is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that he was knowingly a participant with Copous in ensnaring Mrs. Spinks into an act of adultery if such be the facts of the case.

Conclusion

The court ultimately decided to disbar Freemon for ten years, with the possibility of applying for reinstatement after five years, due to his admitted misconduct and the serious nature of the charges against him.

For the reasons indicated, however, we hold that for defendant's admitted misconduct in the Spinks case and for making the charges against Mr. McFarland in the Whitehead cases, the defendant will be disbarred for a period of ten years with the privilege of applying to the Chancellor at the end of five years for re-instatement.

Who won?

Tennessee Bar Association prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the disbarment based on Freemon's unethical conduct and lack of professional integrity.

Attorney disbarred for 10 year period with privilege of applying for reinstatement.

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