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Keywords

statuteappeal

statuteappealpleafelonyprobationvisa

Related Cases

Tetteh v. Garland

Facts

Soloman Tetteh, a native and citizen of Ghana, was convicted of drug and firearm offenses in Georgia. The state later pardoned him, but not before the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove Tetteh based on his convictions. Tetteh argued that he couldn't be removed for pardoned offenses, but he had not exhausted his argument that pardoned offenses don't qualify as convictions under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The IJ ordered Tetteh's removal, and the BIA dismissed his appeal.

Tetteh entered the United States as a student and overstayed his visa. While living in Georgia, Tetteh pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, possessing marijuana, and possessing a firearm in the commission of a crime. A state court sentenced Tetteh to one-and three-year terms of probation to run concurrently. It also applied the Georgia First Offender Act, Ga. Code Ann. 42-8-60, which defers a first-time offender's judgment of guilt until he completes a probationary sentence, after which he 'shall stand discharged . . . and shall be completely exonerated of guilt.'

Issue

Whether a pardoned offense qualifies as a conviction under the Immigration and Nationality Act and whether a pardon waives all grounds for removal related to the pardoned offenses.

Tetteh argues that (1) a pardoned offense isn't a 'conviction' as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act; and (2) a pardon waives all grounds for removal related to the pardoned offenses, not just those listed in the Act.

Rule

The plain language of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) limits the pardon waiver of removability to the grounds listed in the statute.

We hold that the plain language of 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) limits the pardon waiver of removability to the grounds listed in the statute.

Analysis

The court found that Tetteh's pardon did not waive all grounds for removal because the statute specifically enumerates which grounds can be waived. The court noted that Tetteh's offenses are considered 'convictions' under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the pardon he received was not full and unconditional, as it excluded certain rights. Therefore, the court concluded that Tetteh remained removable based on his controlled substance and firearm convictions.

The BIA 'conclude[d] that even if [Tetteh's] pardon was full and unconditional, [he] would remain removable as charged' for his pardoned offenses '[f]or the reasons cited by the Immigration Judge and argued by the [government] on appeal.'

Conclusion

The court dismissed in part and denied in part Tetteh's petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision that Tetteh could still be removed based on his controlled substance and firearm convictions.

For these reasons, we dismiss in part and deny in part Tetteh's petition for review.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case because the court upheld the BIA's decision that Tetteh's pardon did not eliminate the grounds for his removal.

The government sought Tetteh's removal on four grounds: 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for a controlled substance conviction, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C) for a firearm conviction, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for an aggravated felony conviction, and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(A) for being inadmissible at the time of his status adjustment because of his controlled substance offense and because the government had reason to believe that he was an illicit controlled substances trafficker.

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