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negligencesustained
plaintiffdefendantnegligence

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Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 23 S.Ct. 622, 47 L.Ed. 905

Facts

Behymer had been employed as a brakeman for about three months when he was ordered to let off the brakes on some cars covered with ice. After obeying the order, the train stopped suddenly, causing Behymer to lose his balance and be thrown between the cars due to a projecting nail that caught his trousers. The railroad company was responsible for the car, which had been inspected prior to the accident, and Behymer claimed negligence based on the sudden stop and the dangerous condition of the nail.

Behymer had been in the employ of the company as a brakeman about three months. On February 7, 1899, at Big Sandy, in Texas, he was ordered by the conductor of a local freight train to get up on some cars standing on a siding and let off the brakes, so that the engine might move them to the main track and add them to the train.

Issue

The main legal issue was whether the railroad company was liable for Behymer's injuries due to negligence in handling the train and the condition of the car.

The fundamental error alleged in the exceptions to the charge is that the court declined to rule that the chance of such an accident as happened was one of the risks that the plaintiff assumed, or that the question whether the defendant was liable for it depended on whether the freight train was handled in the usual and ordinary way.

Rule

The court applied the standard of ordinary care, stating that what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, regardless of what is usually done.

What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.

Analysis

The court found that the jury was justified in determining that the railroad company did not exercise ordinary care in stopping the train, especially given the known slippery conditions and the presence of the projecting nail. The court emphasized that the risk of a sudden stop was not assumed by Behymer, and the company had a duty to ensure safety under the circumstances.

If it was negligent to stop as the train did stop, the risk of it was not assumed by the plaintiff.

Conclusion

The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Behymer, concluding that the railroad company was negligent and liable for the injuries sustained.

Judgment affirmed.

Who won?

Behymer prevailed in the case because the court found that the railroad company failed to exercise ordinary care, leading to his injuries.

Behymer based his claim upon negligence in stopping the cars so suddenly with knowledge of his position and the slippery condition of the roof of the car, and upon the projection of the nail, which increased the danger and contributed to his fall.

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