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plaintiffdefendantjurisdictiondamagesstatuteappealtrialcorporationdocketwrit of mandamus
plaintiffdefendantjurisdictiondamagesstatuteappealcorporationrespondentwrit of mandamus

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Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584, 46 L.Ed.2d 542

Facts

Two citizens of Kentucky filed a damages action against Thermtron Products, Inc., an Indiana corporation, and its employee, Larry Dean Newhard, in Kentucky state court. The defendants removed the case to the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The district judge, acknowledging the defendants' right to remove the case, nonetheless remanded it to state court, citing his heavy docket as the reason for the remand, which he believed would unjustly delay the plaintiffs from going to trial.

On April 9, 1973, two citizens and residents of Kentucky filed an action in a Kentucky state court against Thermtron Products, Inc., an Indiana corporation without office or place of business in Kentucky, and one Larry Dean Newhard, an employee of Thermtron and a citizen and resident of Indiana, seeking damages for injuries arising out of an automobile accident between plaintiffs' automobile and a vehicle driven by Newhard.

Issue

Whether a Federal District Judge may remand a properly removed diversity case for reasons not authorized by statute, and if not, whether such remand order may be remedied by writ of mandamus.

The questions in this case are whether a Federal District Judge may remand a properly removed diversity case for reasons not authorized by statute, and, if not, whether such remand order may be remedied by writ of mandamus.

Rule

The district court may only remand a case on the grounds specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which allows remand only if the case was removed 'improvidently and without jurisdiction.'

Title 28 U.S.C. s 1441(a) provides that 'any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction' may be removed by the defendant to the federal district court, and s 1446 provides the removal procedure. Section 1447(c) provides for remand to the state court on the ground that the case was removed 'improvidently and without jurisdiction,' and s 1447(d) imposes a general bar against appellate review of a remand order.

Analysis

The Supreme Court found that the district court exceeded its authority by remanding the case based on the crowded condition of its docket, which was not a permissible ground for remand under the removal statutes. The Court emphasized that the right to remove a case is not dependent on the state of the federal court's docket and that the district court's reasoning was irrelevant to the jurisdictional issues at hand. Therefore, the Court concluded that the remand order was improper and that mandamus was the appropriate remedy.

We agree with petitioners: The District Court exceeded its authority in remanding on grounds not permitted by the controlling statute. Although the Court of Appeals, erroneously we think, held that the District Court had jurisdiction to enter its remand order, the Court of Appeals did not mention s 1447(c), did not suggest that the District Court had proceeded under that section, properly or improperly, and did not itself suggest that this case was not removable under s 1441 or that it had been improvidently removed from the state court for want of jurisdiction or otherwise.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the district court had acted beyond its authority in remanding the case.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Who won?

Petitioners (Thermtron Products, Inc. and Larry Dean Newhard) prevailed because the Supreme Court determined that the district court had exceeded its authority in remanding the case based on an impermissible ground.

Petitioners then filed in the Court of Appeals an alternative petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition on the ground that the action had been properly removed and that respondent lacked authority to remand the case on the ground that he had asserted.

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