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Keywords

lawsuitattorneyhearingregulationdue process

trial

Related Cases

Tiffany By and Through Tiffany v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass’n, Inc., 151 Ariz. 134, 726 P.2d 231, 35 Ed. Law Rep. 538

Facts

John Tiffany, a high school senior at St. Mary's High School in Phoenix, sought to participate in interscholastic athletics but was disqualified due to a 19-year-old eligibility rule enforced by the Arizona Interscholastic Association (AIA). Tiffany had been held back in earlier grades due to a learning disability, which resulted in him turning 19 just before the start of his senior year. He requested a hardship waiver from AIA, which was denied despite evidence presented at a hearing that he had a strong desire to participate in sports and that his academic motivation was tied to his athletic eligibility. Tiffany subsequently filed a lawsuit to challenge AIA's decision.

Issue

Does a high school student have a constitutional right to participate in interscholastic athletic competition during his senior year in high school?

Rule

A high school student does not have a constitutional right to participate in interscholastic athletic competition that is protected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, under certain circumstances, a student may establish a due process entitlement in connection with exclusion from high school athletics. Administrative agencies must follow their own rules and regulations, and failure to do so may constitute an unlawful action, even if it does not create a constitutional due process right.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether Tiffany had a constitutionally protected interest in participating in high school athletics. It concluded that while participation in sports is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutional property or liberty interest. The court referenced previous cases that established the need for a legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest, but found that Tiffany's claim did not meet this threshold. The court also noted that AIA's failure to follow its own bylaws in considering Tiffany's waiver request constituted an arbitrary action, but this did not equate to a constitutional violation.

We believe that an appropriate extension of the holding in Goss v. Lopez was expressed by the court in Pegram v. Nelson, 469 F.Supp. 1134 (M.D.N.C.1979). In that case, a high school student was suspended from school for ten days and was also excluded from after-school activities for a period of four months. The court acknowledged that the 'opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities is not, by and in itself, a property interest.'

Conclusion

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Who won?

The court ruled in favor of Tiffany in part, affirming that AIA acted unlawfully by failing to exercise its discretion regarding his waiver request. However, it reversed the award of attorney fees, determining that Tiffany did not demonstrate a constitutional violation that would entitle him to such fees. Thus, while Tiffany succeeded in proving AIA's arbitrary action, he ultimately did not prevail on the broader constitutional claim.

The trial court held that AIA's Executive Board acted 'unreasonably, capriciously and arbitrarily' when it failed to exercise its discretion in considering Tiffany's request for a waiver.

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