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Keywords

tortplaintiffdefendantdamagesprecedentappealmotionsustained

tortplaintiffdefendanttrialmotionsustained

Related Cases

Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554

Facts

On September 18, 1966, the defendant negligently operated his automobile and struck the plaintiff's two-year-old son, Gregory, causing severe injuries. The mother, who was nearby but not an eyewitness to the accident, heard the screech of brakes and rushed outside to find her child injured on the ground. The case revolves around the mother's claim for her own emotional and physical injuries resulting from the shock of witnessing her child's injuries.

On September 18, 1966, defendant, negligently operating his automobile, struck plaintiff's two-year-old son, Gregory, causing severe injuries, including cerebral damage, to him, and emotional and physical injuries to plaintiff, in whose full view and presence the accident occurred.

Issue

Whether a mother may recover against a tort-feasor for her own mental and physical injuries caused by shock and fear for her child who suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident.

The issue is whether a mother may recover against a tort-feasor for her own mental and physical injuries caused by shock and fear for her two-year-old child who suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident.

Rule

No cause of action lies for unintended harm sustained by one, solely as a result of injuries inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the relationship and whether the one was an eyewitness to the incident.

It is concluded that under the well-established applicable doctrines no cause of action lies for unintended harm sustained by one, solely as a result of injuries inflicted directly upon another, regardless of the relationship and whether the one was an eyewitness to the incident which resulted in the direct injuries.

Analysis

The court applied the established rule that a parent cannot recover for emotional distress caused by witnessing harm to their child unless they were an eyewitness to the event. In this case, the mother was not present at the moment of impact and only arrived at the scene afterward, which disqualified her from claiming damages for her emotional injuries under the current legal standards.

In this case, the additional undisputed and varying facts of the pretrial examination are before the court in the record. It is already evident that this action, if it were to go to trial, would involve a mother who was not an eyewitness.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision to dismiss the mother's cause of action, concluding that the legal precedent does not support recovery for emotional injuries in such circumstances.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

Who won?

The defendant prevailed in the case because the court upheld the principle that a parent cannot recover for emotional distress resulting from injuries to their child unless they directly witnessed the incident.

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed and dismissed the cause of action.

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