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plaintiffdefendanttrialwillcorporationgood faith
plaintiffdefendantappealtrialtestimonywillgood faith

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Tuscarora Club of Millbrook v. Brown, 215 N.Y. 543, 109 N.E. 597

Facts

The Tuscarora Club, a corporation focused on game law enforcement and land management, purchased land in Delaware County that included the Mill brook. The land had previously been owned by William H. Brown, who conveyed it to his mother, Sarah A. Brown, with a reservation of fishing rights for himself. The property changed hands through several deeds, all of which recognized Brown's fishing rights. Brown claimed that the conveyance to his mother was a mortgage and that he had repaid her, thus asserting his right to fish in the brook.

In April, 1901, the plaintiff purchased from the First National Bank of Rondout certain lands and premises in Delaware county, which included the land under the water of the Mill brook, where the trespass complained of was committed by the defendant.

Issue

Whether the reservation of fishing rights in the deed from Sarah A. Brown to Margaret A. Carroll was valid against the Tuscarora Club, a subsequent purchaser.

Whether the provision in the deed from Sarah A. Brown to Margaret A. Carroll, reserving the right to the defendant William H. Brown to fish in the Mill brook stream be regarded as a reservation or as an exception makes no difference so far as this case is concerned.

Rule

A reservation or exception in a deed is ineffective to convey any estate or interest to a stranger to the conveyance, and a subsequent purchaser in good faith is protected under the Recording Act.

For whichever way viewed the clause in the deed was entirely ineffectual to convey any estate or interest whatsoever in the lands described to a stranger to the conveyance.

Analysis

The court determined that the reservation of fishing rights was ineffective because William H. Brown was a stranger to the conveyance from Sarah A. Brown to Margaret A. Carroll. The court held that the plaintiff, as a subsequent purchaser, was entitled to rely on the recorded deeds, which did not grant any rights to Brown. The defendant's attempt to prove that he was the true grantor and that the reservation was valid was rejected, as it contradicted the recorded documents.

The defendant could not prove that his mother had no title to the land, and that he (the defendant) was the real grantor, and that, therefore, the exception or reservation was to a party, and not to a stranger, to the conveyance.

Conclusion

The court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division and granted a new trial, concluding that the plaintiff's rights as a subsequent purchaser were not affected by the defendant's claims.

The plaintiff's exceptions to the findings of the court and to the admission of the testimony given by the defendant and his mother were well taken, and I recommend that the judgment appealed from be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

Who won?

Tuscarora Club of Millbrook prevailed because the court found that the reservation of rights was ineffective against them as a subsequent purchaser in good faith.

The plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the Mill brook stream, claiming under the deeds to and from Sarah A. Brown.

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