Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

defendantprecedentpleamotiontrustantitrustdouble jeopardyguilty pleapiracy
defendantpleamotiontrustantitrustdouble jeopardyguilty plea

Related Cases

Bachicha v. Lewis, 105 N.M. 726, 737 P.2d 85, 1987 -NMCA- 053
View Case »
People v. Howk, 56 Cal.2d 687, 365 P.2d 426, 16 Cal.Rptr. 370
View Case »
Harrison v. State, 382 Md. 477, 855 A.2d 1220
View Case »
Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 26 Fla. L. Weekly S579
View Case »
Heald v. State, 492 N.E.2d 671
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

U.S. v. Broce Const. Co., Inc., Not Reported in F.Supp., 1983 WL 1953, 1984-1 Trade Cases P 65,849

Facts

The defendants, Ray C. Broce and Broce Construction Co., Inc., were indicted for violations of federal antitrust laws and mail fraud related to two separate Kansas highway projects. They pleaded guilty to the charges and were sentenced on March 15, 1982, with significant fines and prison time. The defendants later claimed that their sentences violated the double jeopardy clause, arguing that both indictments represented a single conspiracy to rig bids.

On February 8, 1982, defendant Broce Construction Co., Inc., entered a plea of guilty to the antitrust charge in Case No. 81-20119-01 and the antitrust charge in Case No. 82-20011-01. Defendant Ray C. Broce entered pleas of guilty to both counts in Case No. 81-20119-01, and to the one-count antitrust charge in Case No. 82-20011-01.

Issue

Whether the defendants' guilty pleas to two separate indictments alleging different conspiracies constituted a waiver of their double jeopardy claim.

The issue in the case is therefore whether a plea of guilty to counts alleging two separate conspiracies constitutes a waiver of a claim of double jeopardy on the ground that the defendants are being subjected to multiple punishment for a single offense.

Rule

The double jeopardy clause protects against multiple punishments for the same offense, and a guilty plea does not necessarily waive a claim of double jeopardy if the charge is one that the State may not constitutionally prosecute.

It is certainly clear that the double jeopardy clause does protect a defendant against multiplicity of punishment.

Analysis

The court analyzed the defendants' claims in light of their guilty pleas to two separate indictments, each alleging distinct conspiracies. It referenced the precedent set in Menna v. New York, which held that a guilty plea does not waive a double jeopardy claim if the charge is unconstitutional on its face. However, the court found that the indictments in this case were not multiplicitous and that the defendants had accepted the government's allegations of two separate conspiracies.

Evaluated in this way, Kerrigan's claim is quite different from that asserted in Launius; far from being facially multiplicitous, as in Launius, Kerrigan's indictments sufficiently described two separate and distinct offenses, for which Kerrigan could be constitutionally sentenced to two separate terms of imprisonment.

Conclusion

The court denied the defendants' motion to vacate their sentences, concluding that their guilty pleas to separate conspiracies precluded their double jeopardy claim.

It Is Therefore Ordered that defendants' motion to vacate be and hereby is denied.

Who won?

The United States prevailed in this case, as the court found that the defendants' guilty pleas to separate charges did not constitute a waiver of their double jeopardy claim, and the sentences were valid.

The court ultimately denied the motion, holding that the guilty pleas to separate indictments did not waive the double jeopardy claim.

You must be