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defendanttestimonybeyond a reasonable doubt

defendanttestimonywillbeyond a reasonable doubt

Related Cases

U.S. v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042, 1998 Fed.App. 0309P

Facts

In 1990, DeZarn and other officers of the Kentucky National Guard held a fundraising event for gubernatorial candidate Brereton Jones, known as the 'Preakness Party'. DeZarn later testified under oath that the event was not a fundraising activity and denied knowledge of any contributions being made. An investigation revealed that DeZarn had indeed collected contributions at the party, leading to his indictment for perjury based on his false statements during the investigation.

In the spring of 1990, a group of active and retired officers of the Kentucky National Guard, including Defendant Robert DeZarn, Billy Wellman, John Julian, and Ed Gill, met at Billy Wellman's home to discuss raising funds for Brereton Jones' gubernatorial campaign.

Issue

Whether DeZarn could be convicted of perjury despite the imprecise nature of the questioning and whether the literal truth defense applied.

Because we believe that the crime of perjury depends not only upon the clarity of the questioning itself, but also upon the knowledge and reasonable understanding of the testifier as to what is meant by the questioning, we hold that a defendant may be found guilty of perjury if a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence presented that the defendant knew what the question meant and gave knowingly untruthful and materially misleading answers in response.

Rule

A defendant may be found guilty of perjury if a jury can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly provided untruthful and materially misleading answers, regardless of the clarity of the questioning.

To dismiss this indictment for lack of 'stark contrast' would be to apply that rule beyond its rationale and thereby allow the Defendant to 'escape a [perjury] charge by misleading the questioner with false testimony and supply literally true answers to questions based on his false testimony.'

Analysis

The court determined that the context of the questioning made it clear that DeZarn understood the questions were about the 1990 Preakness Party. Despite his claims of confusion regarding the date, the evidence showed that he was aware of the event's significance and had previously discussed it publicly. The court concluded that his answers were knowingly misleading, thus supporting the perjury charge.

The context of the investigation in this case establishes that it would be 'entirely [ ]reasonable to expect that DeZarn understood that the questions posed to him' concerned the 1990 party.

Conclusion

The court affirmed DeZarn's conviction, ruling that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, we find that it was not improper to send to the jury the question whether DeZarn 'willfully and contrary to [his] oath state[d] or subscribe[d] any material matter which he [did] not believe to be true' in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1621.

Who won?

The United States prevailed in the case, as the court found that DeZarn's testimony was knowingly false and materially misleading, which constituted perjury.

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