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hearingprosecutorappelleeadmissibility
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United States v. Agurs, 520 F.2d 82 (Mem), 171 U.S.App.D.C. 350

Facts

The case involved a suggestion for rehearing en banc after a panel decision that raised questions about the admissibility of the decedent's prior convictions in a homicide case. The defense counsel was aware of the decedent's potential past violent crimes but did not request the government to produce the decedent's record. The panel's ruling that the government was required to disclose the decedent's prior convictions was challenged, as both the prosecutor and defense counsel believed the convictions were inadmissible.

In spite of the fact that defense counsel was 'aware . . . of the possibility that Sewell (the decedent) might have been arrested or convicted in the past for a violent crime,' defense counsel never requested the Government to produce decedent's record.

Issue

Whether the panel's ruling regarding the admissibility of the decedent's prior convictions and the requirement for the government to disclose them was valid.

The panel's holding that the Government was still required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), to disclose to the defense a decedent's prior convictions for simple assault and carrying a dangerous weapon, three and twelve years prior to the offense, is of dubious validity in light of the Supreme Court's more recent statement in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972).

Rule

The court applied the principles established in Brady v. Maryland regarding the prosecution's obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, as well as the rules concerning the admissibility of evidence related to a decedent's past violent acts in self-defense cases.

The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution's suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material either to guilt or punishment.

Analysis

The court analyzed the panel's ruling in light of the established legal principles, noting that the defense counsel's failure to request the decedent's record undermined the argument for the prosecution's obligation to disclose it. Additionally, the court found that the panel's interpretation of the admissibility of past violent acts was inconsistent with established rules, which typically allow only general reputation evidence rather than specific acts that are remote in time.

This Circuit has not adopted the two principles of law relied on in the panel opinion to reverse this conviction for second degree murder.

Conclusion

The court ultimately denied the suggestion for rehearing en banc, indicating that the panel's decision did not warrant further review by the full court.

My vote against rehearing is not necessarily an approval of the panel's judgment or opinion.

Who won?

The prevailing party was the appellee, as the court denied the suggestion for rehearing en banc, thereby upholding the panel's decision.

The court's action in ordering a new trial does not seem to me such a departure from doctrine and acceptable standards of judicial administration as to require en banc consideration.

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