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Keywords

statuteprecedentmotionfelonymotion to dismiss

defendantstatuteprecedentmotionfelonygrand jurymotion to dismiss

Related Cases

United States v. Barnard, 704 F.Supp.3d 259

Facts

On March 6, 2023, Jeffrey Paul Barnard was stopped by police for driving with an expired learner's permit, during which officers found him in possession of a firearm. Barnard, having four prior felony convictions, was indicted on May 18, 2023, for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to dismiss the indictment on September 15, 2023, claiming the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him due to his Second Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense.

On March 6, 2023, Jeffrey Paul Barnard was stopped by the police for allegedly driving with an expired learner's permit. During this stop, officers claim that they found Mr. Barnard knowingly in possession of a firearm. As Mr. Barnard had four prior felony convictions, on May 18, 2023, a federal grand jury charged Mr. Barnard in a one-count indictment as being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Issue

Does the statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, as applied to Barnard, violate his Second Amendment rights?

A defendant charged with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) moves the Court to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because it violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms in self-defense.

Rule

The court applied the precedent that the Second Amendment does not protect the right of felons to possess firearms, as established in prior cases including Heller and Torres-Rosario.

The Court denies the motion in line with First Circuit precedent holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.

Analysis

The court analyzed Barnard's arguments against the backdrop of established First Circuit precedent, which has consistently upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to felons. The court noted that Barnard's criminal history included violent offenses, which further justified the application of the statute to him. The court found that Barnard's claims did not sufficiently challenge the longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by felons.

Mr. Barnard's argument is unavailing. Mr. Barnard is correct that Heller rejected the long-standing principle that rights granted by the Second Amendment were in relation to a ‘militia.’

Conclusion

The court concluded that Barnard's motion to dismiss the indictment was denied, affirming that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him.

The Court DENIES Jeffrey Paul Barnard's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 48).

Who won?

The Government prevailed in the case, as the court upheld the constitutionality of the statute under which Barnard was indicted, citing established precedent that supports prohibitions on firearm possession by felons.

The Government contends that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Mr. Barnard.

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