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defendantstatuteappealpleamotionleaseregulationprobationstatute of limitations

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United States v. Dunnigan, 605 F.Supp.3d 487

Facts

Pethrod Dunnigan was convicted by guilty plea of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to commit money laundering, resulting in a 156-month prison sentence. He filed a pro se motion for compassionate release, citing health concerns related to COVID-19 and his medical conditions, including obesity and hypertension. The court previously denied his motion for compassionate release, and Dunnigan subsequently filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, arguing that changes in state law regarding marijuana offenses should affect his criminal history calculation.

Defendant is currently housed at Federal Correctional Institution McKean (“FCI McKean”), and he is scheduled to be released on October 9, 2027. According to statistics published on a BOP website, FCI McKean currently has no inmates testing positive for the virus causing COVID-19.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether Dunnigan established extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release and whether his motion to vacate his sentence was timely and valid under the law.

1 inmate failed to establish that extraordinary and compelling reason existed to warrant compassionate release; 2 statutory sentencing factors did not support granting compassionate release; 3 New York's decriminalization of certain offenses involving marijuana did not extend one-year statute of limitations for filing motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence; 4 imposition of 156-month sentence did not constitute miscarriage of justice; and 5 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence was barred by appeal and collateral attack waiver in plea agreement.

Rule

The court applied the compassionate release statute under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which allows for sentence modification only if extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction and if the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support modification.

The compassionate release statute, as amended by the First Step Act, is such a statutory exception, and provides as follows: The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that … the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that … extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction … and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

Analysis

The court found that Dunnigan did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of extraordinary and compelling circumstances, particularly in light of his vaccination status and the lack of current COVID-19 cases at his facility. Additionally, the court noted that Dunnigan's extensive criminal history and the nature of his offenses weighed against granting compassionate release. The court also determined that the changes in state law regarding marijuana did not retroactively affect his criminal history calculation.

While the Court agrees that Defendant suffers from pre-existing medical conditions that place him at an increased risk of serious illness from COVID-19, the Court continues to believe—as it did at the time it issued the December 9, 2020 D&O—that his motion for compassionate release should be denied. Defendant has offered no additional evidence supporting his request for compassionate release and, in fact, the additional evidence before the Court—that he violated the BOP's rules and regulations by possessing a hazardous tool—does not weigh in his favor.

Conclusion

The court denied Dunnigan's motions for compassionate release and to vacate his sentence, concluding that he failed to demonstrate the necessary grounds for relief.

Accordingly, on the record before the Court, a reduction of Defendant's prison sentence is not warranted, and therefore his motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Dkt. 428) is denied.

Who won?

The United States prevailed in this case as the court denied Dunnigan's motions, finding that he did not meet the criteria for compassionate release or for vacating his sentence.

The government opposes Defendant's motion, arguing that he has neither established extraordinary and compelling circumstances nor that the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) justify his release.

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