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appealrespondentpiracy
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United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128

Facts

The respondents were indicted along with sixty-three others for conspiring to operate illicit stills in New York. The case was presented to a jury, which convicted five respondents and sixteen still operators. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, arguing that there was no evidence proving the respondents were conspirators, as the indictment did not specifically allege their knowledge of the conspiracy, only that they sold materials knowing they would be used for illicit distilling.

All of respondents were jobbers or distributors who, during the period in question, sold sugar, yeast or cans, some of which found their way into the possession and use of some of the distiller defendants.

Issue

Whether one who sells materials with knowledge that they are intended for use in the production of illicit distilled spirits may be convicted as a co-conspirator with a distiller.

The Government does not argue here the point which seems to be implicit in the question raised by its petition for certiorari, that conviction of conspiracy can rest on proof alone of knowingly supplying an illicit distiller, who is not conspiring with others.

Rule

To be guilty of conspiracy, there must be an agreement among conspirators to commit an offense, and mere knowledge of the intended use of materials does not establish participation in the conspiracy.

The gist of the offense of conspiracy as defined by s 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. s 88, 18 U.S.C.A. s 88, is agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense attended by an act of one or more of the conspirators to effect the object of the conspiracy.

Analysis

The court analyzed the evidence presented and determined that it only showed the respondents' knowledge that the materials sold would be used for illicit distilling, but did not demonstrate their participation in a conspiracy. The court emphasized that the respondents were not charged with aiding and abetting illicit distilling and could not be considered conspirators without knowledge of the conspiracy.

The opinion below proceeded on the assumption that the evidence showed only that respondents or some of them knew that the materials sold would be used in the distillation of illicit spirits, and fell short of showing respondents' participation in the conspiracy or that they knew of it.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the respondents were guilty of conspiracy.

Affirmed.

Who won?

The respondents prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that there was insufficient evidence to prove their participation in the conspiracy.

The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the conviction of the five respondents on the ground that as there was no evidence that respondents were themselves conspirators, the sale by them of materials, knowing that they would be used by others in illicit distilling, was not sufficient to establish that respondents were guilty of the conspiracy charged.

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