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Keywords

liabilitymotioncivil procedure

motioncivil procedure

Related Cases

United States v. USX Corp., Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2006 WL 8462106

Facts

In 1999, the Waukegan Community Unit School District and other parties entered into a consent decree to address potential liability under CERCLA for the Yeoman Creek Landfill. The District had previously authorized the filling of low-lying land with waste, leading to contamination discovered by the EPA. Despite paying over $1.7 million towards cleanup, the District argued it could no longer afford its obligations and claimed it had recently learned it never owned the landfill, thus disputing its liability.

The District maintains that it is entitled to relief from its obligations under the decree for two different reasons: it can no longer afford to pay its share of the clean-up costs, and it recently discovered that it never owned Yeoman Creek Landfill and could not have legally authorized the land's use as a landfill.

Issue

Did the Waukegan Community Unit School District demonstrate sufficient grounds to modify or relieve itself from the consent decree under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6)?

Rule

Under Rule 60(b)(5), a court may modify a consent decree if it has become unjust or unenforceable due to changed factual or legal circumstances. The moving party bears the burden of showing a significant change in conditions. Rule 60(b)(6) allows for relief in exceptional circumstances, but is not applicable if relief is available under other provisions.

Under Rule 60(b)(5), a district court may modify a consent decree if it has become unjust, illegal, or unenforceable due to changed factual or legal circumstances.

Analysis

The court found that the District's financial difficulties were anticipated and not a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(5). The District had previously acknowledged its financial struggles during the original consent decree negotiations. Additionally, the court noted that the District's claim of not owning the landfill did not constitute a change in factual circumstances, as its ownership status had not changed since the decree was entered.

The District has not shown, however, that these circumstances have changed – if they have changed at all – in an unanticipated manner.

Conclusion

The court denied the District's motion for relief from the consent decree, concluding that the District did not meet the necessary threshold to demonstrate an unanticipated change in circumstances.

Because the District has not made the required threshold showing that there has been an unanticipated change in fact or law, the Court denies its motion under Rule 60(b)(5).

Who won?

The United States and the other parties to the consent decree prevailed, as the court found the District's claims for relief were not substantiated.

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