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Keywords

statutehabeas corpusleaseprobationnaturalizationlienspiracy
statutehabeas corpusleaseprobationnaturalizationlienspiracy

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Velasquez v. Reno

Facts

Petitioner, Jose Velasquez, was born in Panama and became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1960. He pled guilty to conspiracy to sell and the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in 1980 and was sentenced to probation. Nineteen years later, upon returning from a visit to Panama, he was taken into custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for removal proceedings based on his past conviction. He argued that the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C.S. 1226(c) could not be applied to him retroactively as he had been released from criminal custody long before the statute took effect.

Petitioner, Jose Velasquez, was born in Panama and became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1960. He pled guilty to conspiracy to sell and the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in 1980 and was sentenced to probation. Nineteen years later, upon returning from a visit to Panama, he was taken into custody by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for removal proceedings based on his past conviction. He argued that the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C.S. 1226(c) could not be applied to him retroactively as he had been released from criminal custody long before the statute took effect.

Issue

Whether 8 U.S.C.S. 1226(c) can be applied retroactively to a petitioner who was released from criminal custody before the statute took effect.

Whether 8 U.S.C.S. 1226(c) can be applied retroactively to a petitioner who was released from criminal custody before the statute took effect.

Rule

The statute providing for mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.S. 1226(c) applies only prospectively to aliens who are released from criminal custody after the statute's effective date.

The statute providing for mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.S. 1226(c) applies only prospectively to aliens who are released from criminal custody after the statute's effective date.

Analysis

The court determined that the mandatory detention provision could not be applied to Velasquez because he was released from criminal custody over a decade before the statute took effect. The court emphasized that Congress intended for the statute to apply only to those released after its enactment, thus supporting the petitioner's argument against retroactive application.

The court determined that the mandatory detention provision could not be applied to Velasquez because he was released from criminal custody over a decade before the statute took effect. The court emphasized that Congress intended for the statute to apply only to those released after its enactment, thus supporting the petitioner's argument against retroactive application.

Conclusion

The court granted the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the statute providing for mandatory detention could not be applied retroactively to him.

The court granted the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the statute providing for mandatory detention could not be applied retroactively to him.

Who won?

Petitioner, Jose Velasquez, prevailed because the court found that the mandatory detention statute could not be applied retroactively to his case.

Petitioner, Jose Velasquez, prevailed because the court found that the mandatory detention statute could not be applied retroactively to his case.

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