Featured Chrome Extensions:

Casey IRACs are produced by an AI that analyzes the opinion’s content to construct its analysis. While we strive for accuracy, the output may not be flawless. For a complete and precise understanding, please refer to the linked opinions above.

Keywords

liabilitystatuteharassmentleasecivil rightshuman rightslegislative intent
statutewillharassmentleasecivil rightsrespondent

Related Cases

Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 58 USLW 2004
View Case »
Nulle v. Krewer, 374 Ill.App.3d 802, 872 N.E.2d 567, 313 Ill.Dec. 584
View Case »
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Kane, 213 Md. 152, 131 A.2d 470
View Case »
Bruns v. City of Centralia, 2014 IL 116998, 21 N.E.3d 684, 386 Ill.Dec. 765
View Case »
Wallace v. Rosen, 765 N.E.2d 192, 162 Ed. Law Rep. 966
View Case »
Justia Law Link
LexisNexis Link
Westlaw Link
CourtListener Link
Oyez Link

Washington v. Robertson County, 29 S.W.3d 466

Facts

On September 2, 1996, Deputy Dana Hackert pursued a suspected intoxicated driver in Robertson County. After the suspect's car stopped, four African American males fled into the woods. Washington and Carr, who were nearby, were stopped at gunpoint, sprayed with mace, and handcuffed, but were released without charges when they could not be identified as being in the suspect vehicle. They subsequently filed a civil claim alleging violations of their rights.

The relevant facts were set forth by the district court in its certified request for review, which we shall summarize as follows. On September 2, 1996, shortly after midnight, Deputy Dana Hackert was in pursuit of a car being driven in Robertson County by a suspected intoxicated driver. At one point, the car pulled to the side of the road, but then sped away as Deputy Hackert stepped out of his patrol car. The chase occurred at speeds exceeding eighty miles per hour and led into the City of Springfield. When the suspect car stopped on 21st Avenue, Deputy Hackert saw four African American males running from the car into nearby woods. One of the men was wearing a white T-shirt. Trent Washington and Marcus Carr, both of whom are African American men, were in the yard of a friend's home on 20th Avenue. Carr was wearing a white T-shirt. Carr was stopped at gunpoint, sprayed with chemical mace, and handcuffed. Washington was chased by an officer with a police dog, stopped, ordered to lie down, and handcuffed. Washington and Carr were released without being arrested or charged with a crime when neither could be identified as having been in the suspect car pursued by officers.

Issue

1) What are the elements of a claim for civil malicious harassment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4–21–701? 2) May a claim be brought against a private individual or an employee of a government agency in his or her individual capacity for a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4–21–701? 3) May a city or county be found liable for violations of Tenn. Code Ann. § 4–21–701 committed by its agents or employees?

1) What are the elements of a claim for civil malicious harassment under Tenn.Code Ann. § 4–21–701 (1998) and which, if any, criminal statute provides the framework for the cause of action; 2) May a claim be brought against a private individual or an employee of a government agency in his or her individual capacity for a violation of Tenn.Code Ann. § 4–21–701 (1998); and 3) May a city or county be found liable for violations of Tenn.Code Ann. § 4–21–701 (1998) committed by its agents or employees.

Rule

The elements of a civil claim of malicious harassment are derived from the criminal offense of civil rights intimidation. Individuals and governmental entities may be liable for malicious harassment committed by their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Accordingly, we conclude that the elements of a civil malicious harassment action under Tenn.Code Ann. § 4–21–701 are derived from the criminal offense of civil rights intimidation under Tenn.Code Ann. § 39–17–309 (1997). We further conclude that a civil claim of malicious harassment may be brought against a private individual or an employee of a government agency in his or her individual capacity, and that a governmental entity may also be found liable for violations committed by its agents or employees in accordance with the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory language and legislative intent behind Tenn. Code Ann. § 4–21–701, concluding that the elements of malicious harassment require malicious intent and unlawful intimidation. The court found that the definition of 'person' in the statute includes individuals and governmental entities, thus allowing for individual liability. Furthermore, the court determined that governmental entities could be held liable for the actions of their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior, as the statute does not limit liability to actions taken under a specific policy or custom.

Accordingly, we conclude that a claim of malicious harassment requires not only that a person acted maliciously, i.e., ill-will, hatred or spite, but also that a person unlawfully intimidated another from the free exercise or enjoyment of a constitutional right by injuring or threatening to injure or coercing another person or by damaging, destroying or defacing any real or personal property of another person.

Conclusion

The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the elements of the civil claim of malicious harassment are derived from the criminal offense of civil rights intimidation, that claims may be brought against individuals, and that governmental entities may be liable for the acts of their employees.

After consideration of the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the elements of the civil claim of malicious harassment under Tenn.Code Ann. § 4–21–701 (1998) are derived from the criminal offense of civil rights intimidation under Tenn.Code Ann. § 39–17–309 (1997); that a claim may be brought against a private individual or an employee of a government agency in his or her individual capacity; and that a governmental entity may be liable for the acts of its employees committed in the course and scope of employment pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Who won?

Washington and Carr prevailed in establishing that malicious harassment claims can be brought against individuals and governmental entities, affirming their rights under the Tennessee Human Rights Act.

The respondents, Washington and Carr, filed a civil claim in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the petitioners, Robertson County, the City of Springfield, and several named and unnamed law enforcement officers.

You must be