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Keywords

tortplaintifflitigationstatutesummary judgmentappellantappellee
plaintiffstatutetrialsummary judgmentappellantappellee

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Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 87 S.Ct. 357, 17 L.Ed.2d 286

Facts

The litigation began when appellant Watkins brought a tort action against Conway in a Florida circuit court, resulting in a $25,000 judgment on October 5, 1955. Five years and one day later, Watkins attempted to sue on this judgment in a Georgia superior court. The appellee raised a Georgia statute that barred suits on foreign judgments after five years, leading to a summary judgment in favor of the appellee. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed this decision, rejecting Watkins' constitutional challenge.

The Georgia trial court gave summary judgment for appellee. In so doing, it rejected appellant's contention that s 3—701, when read against the longer limitation period on domestic judgments set forth in Ga.Code ss 110—1001, 110—1002 (1935), was inconsistent with the Full Faith and Credit and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution.

Issue

Does the Georgia statute requiring that suits on foreign judgments be brought within five years violate the Full Faith and Credit and Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution?

Although appellant lays his claim under two constitutional provisions, in reality his complaint is simply that Georgia has drawn an impermissible distinction between foreign and domestic judgments.

Rule

The Georgia statute provides that all suits on judgments obtained out of the State shall be brought within five years after such judgments shall have been obtained, but it allows for the revival of judgments in the state where they were originally obtained.

‘Suits upon foreign judgments.—All suits upon judgments obtained out of this State shall be brought within five years after such judgments shall have been obtained.’

Analysis

The court determined that the Georgia statute did not discriminate against foreign judgments, as it only barred suits if the plaintiff could not revive their judgment in the state where it was originally obtained. The relevant date for applying the statute was the date of the latest revival of the judgment, not the date of the original judgment. Therefore, Watkins could return to Florida to revive his judgment and then file suit in Georgia within the five-year limit.

The statute bars suits on foreign judgments only if the plaintiff cannot revive his judgment in the State where it was originally obtained. For the relevant date in applying s 3—701 is not the date of the original judgment, but rather it is the date of the latest revival of the judgment.

Conclusion

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling, concluding that the statute did not violate the Full Faith and Credit or Equal Protection Clauses. The court held that the statute was valid and did not discriminate against foreign judgments.

Affirmed.

Who won?

The prevailing party was Conway, as the court upheld the Georgia statute that barred Watkins' suit due to the expiration of the five-year limit.

The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, also rejecting appellant's constitutional challenge to s 3—701.

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