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Keywords

damagesnegligencestatuteappealtrialverdictwillcontributory negligence

plaintiffdefendantdamagesnegligencestatutetrialwillcontributory negligencerespondentappellant

Related Cases

White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617

Facts

Dorothy White sued Henry Yup for damages after a collision at an intersection in Reno, Nevada, where Yup's vehicle struck the car driven by her husband, William White, in which she was a passenger. Dorothy sought damages for her personal injuries and for the wrongful death of her 8-month-old fetus, which was viable at the time of the accident but stillborn as a result. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Yup, leading to Dorothy's appeal.

Appellant, Dorothy White, sued respondent, Henry Yup, for damages resulting from a two-car collision at a street intersection, when a motor vehicle driven by Yup struck a car driven by Dorothy's husband, William White, in which Dorothy was riding as a passenger.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the negligence of Dorothy's husband was imputable to her and whether a cause of action exists for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.

1 Dorothy seeks a reversal of the judgment and a new trial on the ground that the trial judge did not properly instruct the jury.

Rule

The court applied the rule that a husband's contributory negligence cannot be imputed to his wife in Nevada, as established in Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd. Additionally, the court recognized that a cause of action exists for the wrongful death of a viable fetus.

1 Ever since the case of Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940) , it has been the law of Nevada that a husband's contributory negligence may not be imputed to his wife so as to preclude her recovery against a third person who has caused her injury.

Analysis

The court found that the trial judge's instruction to the jury regarding the imputation of negligence was improper, as it contradicted established Nevada law. The court emphasized that the Family Purpose Statute does not abrogate the rule that a wife's right to recover for personal injuries is independent of her husband's negligence. Furthermore, the court held that a viable fetus is considered a person for the purposes of wrongful death claims, allowing Dorothy to pursue damages for the loss of her unborn child.

We agree that the application of the Family Purpose Statute would be defeated if the doctrine were to be used to prevent recovery from a negligent defendant by a nonnegligent plaintiff, and we hold that it has not abrogated the Fredrickson rule.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, ruling that the improper jury instruction necessitated a reevaluation of the case.

Accordingly, based on the trend of modern authority, we hold that a cause of action does exist for the wrongful death of an unborn 8-months-old viable fetus.

Who won?

The prevailing party is Dorothy White, as the Supreme Court reversed the judgment in favor of Yup, allowing her to pursue her claims for personal injuries and the wrongful death of her fetus.

The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, ruling that the improper jury instruction necessitated a reevaluation of the case.

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