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Keywords

liabilityappealtrial

plaintiffdefendantnegligenceliabilityappealtrialappellantappellee

Related Cases

Whitefield v. Stewart, 577 P.2d 1295, 1978 OK 55

Facts

The case arose when Kimberly Sue Whitefield, a six-year-old girl, was allegedly bitten by a woolly monkey owned by Larry M. Stewart. The monkey had been kept in Stewart's home for eight years and had interacted with many children without incident. On the day of the alleged bite, the monkey was chained to a fence, and Kimberly had been warned not to tease it. Evidence suggested that Kimberly had previously teased the monkey, which raised questions about provocation. The trial included conflicting testimonies regarding the circumstances of the bite.

On June 27, 1974, six-year-old Kimberly Sue Whitefield, hereinafter referred to as Appellant Kimberly, who resided two doors from Appellee and his wife in a Del City, Oklahoma, residential neighborhood, was allegedly bitten by Appellee's monkey.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether the monkey owner could be held liable for the child's injuries and whether evidence of the child's prior teasing of the monkey was admissible.

The issues raised by the Appellants were: (1) The Trial Court erroneously held that liability was controlled by negligence and erred in so instructing the jury; (2) the Trial Court admitted evidence that the minor plaintiff had on previous occasions teased the defendant's pet, which evidence coupled with the court's instructions concerning provocation, was prejudicial.

Rule

The court applied the principle that an owner of a domesticated animal, such as a monkey, could be held liable for injuries caused by the animal, similar to the modified absolute liability imposed on dog owners under Oklahoma law.

We think this philosophy directly applicable to the case at bar involving a tamed wild animal, such as a monkey, and hold that one who chooses to harbor a monkey on his premises is responsible for the acts of the animal to the same extent as provided in 4 O.S.1971, s 42.1, supra, in the case of owners of dogs.

Analysis

The Supreme Court analyzed the facts and determined that the owner of the monkey had a responsibility to prevent the animal from injuring others, particularly if the owner had prior knowledge of the animal's potential for aggression. The court found that the evidence presented required a jury to consider whether the child was bitten and if the bite was provoked by her actions.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and directed that the case be retried to address the issues of whether the child was bitten and whether any provocation occurred.

CERTIORARI GRANTED; DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Who won?

The prevailing party was Larry M. Stewart, the monkey's owner, as the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in his favor, indicating that the case should be retried to determine the facts surrounding the incident.

The prevailing party was Larry M. Stewart, the monkey's owner, as the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in his favor.

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