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Keywords

tortplaintiffdefendantdamagesmotioncivil rightscase law

plaintiffdefendantdamages

Related Cases

Yonaty v. Mincolla, 97 A.D.3d 141, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774, 40 Media L. Rep. 2014, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 04248

Facts

The plaintiff alleged that a nonparty informed the defendant that he was gay or bisexual, which the defendant then relayed to a third-party, a close family friend of the plaintiff's girlfriend. This led to the deterioration of the plaintiff's relationship with his girlfriend. The plaintiff filed an action against the defendant for slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and prima facie tort, while the defendant sought indemnification through a third-party action based on the republication of the statements.

After a nonparty allegedly told defendant that plaintiff was gay or bisexual, defendant relayed that information to third-party defendant, a close family friend of plaintiff's long-time girlfriend, with the hope that the girlfriend would be told.

Issue

Whether statements falsely describing a person as lesbian, gay, or bisexual constitute slander per se.

Whether particular statements are susceptible of a defamatory meaning—and therefore actionable—presents a question of law.

Rule

The court ruled that statements falsely imputing homosexuality are not defamatory per se, overruling previous case law that categorized such statements as slanderous.

We agree with defendant and amici that these Appellate Division decisions are inconsistent with current public policy and should no longer be followed.

Analysis

The court analyzed the public policy of New York regarding the civil rights of individuals who are lesbian, gay, or bisexual, concluding that the prior categorization of statements imputing homosexuality as slanderous per se was inconsistent with contemporary societal attitudes. The court emphasized that the defamatory nature of statements depends on the prevailing public opinion, which has evolved to respect and protect the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals.

In light of the tremendous evolution in social attitudes regarding homosexuality, the elimination of the legal sanctions that troubled the Second Department in 1984 and the considerable legal protection and respect that the law of this state now accords lesbians, gays and bisexuals, it cannot be said that current public opinion supports a rule that would equate statements imputing homosexuality with accusations of serious criminal conduct or insinuations that an individual has a loathsome disease.

Conclusion

The court concluded that the disputed statements were not slanderous per se, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiff's slander claim due to his failure to allege special damages. The court also dismissed the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort.

In short, the disputed statements in this case are not slanderous per se and, thus, plaintiff's failure to allege special damages requires that the remaining cause of action for slander be dismissed.

Who won?

The defendant prevailed in the case as the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding that the statements in question were not slanderous per se.

The court concluded that the disputed statements were not slanderous per se, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiff's slander claim due to his failure to allege special damages.

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