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Keywords

motionasylumdeportation
motionasylumliens

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Yuen Jin v. Mukasey

Facts

The petitioners, all Chinese citizens, were under final orders of removal and sought to reopen their deportation proceedings based on the birth of additional children in the U.S. after their removal orders. The BIA denied their motions, stating that they had only alleged changed personal circumstances and not changed country conditions, which was required for an untimely motion to reopen. The BIA's decision was based on its interpretation of relevant statutory provisions and was later affirmed by the court.

The aliens, who were all under final orders of removal, argued that they should have been permitted to reopen their removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C.S. 1229a(c)(7)(A), or file successive asylum petitions under 8 U.S.C.S. 1158(a)(2)(D) based on changed personal circumstances from the birth of additional children in the U.S.

Issue

Whether an alien subject to a final order of removal who files a successive asylum application based only on changed personal circumstances must also file a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions when the ninety-day deadline has passed for such a motion.

Whether an alien subject to a final order of removal who files a successive asylum application based only on changed personal circumstances must also file a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), when the ninety-day deadline has passed for such a motion.

Rule

An alien under a final removal order must file a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to pursue a successive asylum application, as established by 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(A) and 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

An alien who is subject to a final removal order and who wishes to reopen his proceedings generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file that motion within ninety days of the date of entry of the final order.

Analysis

The court applied the rule by determining that the BIA's interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions was not arbitrary or capricious. It held that the petitioners' claims of changed personal circumstances, such as the birth of children in the U.S., did not meet the requirement for reopening their cases without demonstrating changed country conditions. The court deferred to the BIA's decision in In re C-W-L, which established that a motion to reopen is necessary for filing a successive asylum application under these circumstances.

The court accorded Chevron deference to this BIA ruling, and thus, held that an alien who was subject to a final removal order, and who wished to file a successive asylum application, was required to do so in conjunction with a motion to reopen, and thus could not do so based solely on changed personal circumstances.

Conclusion

The court denied the petitions for review, vacated any previously granted stays of removal, and dismissed as moot any pending motions for a stay of removal.

The court denied the petitions for review, vacated any previously granted stays of removal, and dismissed as moot any pending motions for a stay of removal.

Who won?

The government prevailed in the case because the court upheld the BIA's interpretation that the petitioners could not reopen their cases based solely on changed personal circumstances.

The government prevailed in the case because the court upheld the BIA's interpretation that the petitioners could not reopen their cases based solely on changed personal circumstances.

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