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Keywords

contractdamagesattorneytrialpleatrustwillimplied contract

contracttrialpleamotionsummary judgmenttrustwillimplied contractmotion for summary judgment

Related Cases

Zelnick v. Adams, 263 Va. 601, 561 S.E.2d 711

Facts

Jonathan Ray Adams was born to Mildred A. Adams and Cecil D. Hylton, Jr. His paternity was established through a court order in Florida. After his grandfather's death, Jonathan's mother sought legal representation to protect his interests in the trusts established by his grandfather's will. An attorney, Robert J. Zelnick, agreed to represent Jonathan on a contingency fee basis. After Jonathan reached the age of majority, he disaffirmed the contract, claiming it was void as it was not for necessaries. The trial court ruled in his favor, voiding the contract but awarding Zelnick damages under quantum meruit.

Jonathan's grandfather, Cecil D. Hylton, Sr. (“Hylton Sr.”), died testate on August 25, 1989. His will established certain trusts and provided that the trustees had sole discretion to determine who qualified as 'issue' under the will.

Issue

Whether a contract for legal services entered into on behalf of a minor is voidable upon a plea of infancy or subject to enforcement as an implied contract for necessaries.

Rule

Under Virginia law, a contract with an infant is not void, only voidable upon attaining the age of majority. Contracts for necessaries, including legal services, may not be avoided if they are deemed necessary for the infant's position and condition.

Under well and long-established Virginia law, a contract with an infant is not void, only voidable by the infant upon attaining the age of majority.

Analysis

The court analyzed whether the legal services provided by Zelnick were necessary for Jonathan's situation. It determined that the trial court erred in concluding that the contract was void because it did not consider the necessity of the services at the time they were rendered. The court emphasized that the determination of necessity is a factual issue that must be resolved based on the circumstances surrounding the provision of services.

The trial court's determination that the necessaries doctrine did not apply was made upon motion for summary judgment filed by Jonathan. Nowhere in Jonathan's motion for summary judgment is the issue raised that the services were unnecessary at the time rendered and should have been delayed until Jonathan reached the age of majority.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the legal services were necessary and, if so, the reasonable value of those services.

We hold that a contract for legal services is within the 'general classes of necessaries' that may defeat a plea of infancy.

Who won?

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, indicating that Jonathan did not prevail in voiding the contract as the necessity of the legal services needed to be further evaluated.

The Supreme Court held that a genuine issue of material fact, whether legal services were necessary, precluded summary judgment.

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