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Keywords

plaintiffdefendantdamagesnegligencestatuteappealtrialcontributory negligence
plaintiffdefendantdamagesnegligencestatuteappealtrial

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Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270

Facts

The accident occurred on March 7, 1969, when Eleanor Zeni, a 56-year-old nurse, was walking to work along a snowpath with her back to oncoming traffic instead of using the snow-covered sidewalk. The defendant, Karen Anderson, was driving within the speed limit when she struck Zeni. Eyewitnesses testified that Anderson's visibility was impaired due to a clouded windshield, and Zeni suffered serious injuries, including a subdural hematoma, resulting in permanent disability.

The accident which precipitated this action occurred one snowy morning, March 7, 1969, when the temperature was 11 F, the sky was clear and the average snow depth was 21 inches. Plaintiff Eleanor Zeni, then a 56-year-old registered nurse, was walking to her work at the Northern Michigan University Health Center in Marquette. Instead of using the snow-covered sidewalk, which in any event would have required her to walk across the street twice to get to her job, she traveled along a well-used pedestrian snowpath, with her back to oncoming traffic.

Issue

The main legal issues were whether Zeni's alleged violation of a statute constituted contributory negligence and the sufficiency of the jury instruction on the last clear chance doctrine.

Two issues confront us in this negligence case. The first is the effect of an alleged violation of statute by plaintiff. The second is the sufficiency of Michigan Standard Jury Instruction 14.01 on last clear chance.

Rule

The court ruled that a violation of a penal statute by either party creates a prima facie case of negligence, allowing the jury to consider whether a legally sufficient excuse exists to refute that inference. Additionally, the court found that the last clear chance doctrine applies only when the plaintiff's negligence has ceased to operate as a proximate cause of the injury.

We hold that violation of a statute by plaintiff or defendant creates a prima facie case from which a jury may draw an inference of negligence. The jury may also consider whether a legally sufficient excuse has been presented to refute this inference.

Analysis

The court analyzed the facts and determined that Zeni's choice to walk on the roadway instead of the sidewalk could be seen as a violation of the statute, but the jury was instructed to consider whether it was practicable for her to use the sidewalk. The court also emphasized that even if Zeni was negligent, the jury could still find for her if they determined that Anderson failed to exercise ordinary care after becoming aware of Zeni's danger.

The jury found defendant ‘guilty of subsequent negligence’ and awarded plaintiff damages of $30,000.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's ruling, allowing Zeni to recover damages despite her contributory negligence, based on the finding of Anderson's subsequent negligence.

We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.

Who won?

Eleanor Zeni prevailed in the case because the Supreme Court found that the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.

The jury in the case at bar apparently found the plaintiff contributorily negligent, but still awarded damages to her because of a finding that defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.

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