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deportationnaturalizationliens

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Zuluaga-Martinez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

Facts

Petitioner Leonardo Zuluaga Martinez, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States in April 1985 and became a legal permanent resident on December 1, 1990. He was arrested for possession of heroin on April 9, 1995, leading to a conviction in May 1998 for illegal possession of drugs and assault and battery. Following his convictions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated removal proceedings against him, citing his criminal convictions as grounds for deportation.

Issue

Whether the application of the 'criminal-offense stop-time rule' under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B) to Zuluaga's case was impermissibly retroactive.

Zuluaga maintains that the criminal-offense stop-time rule, which became effective on April 1, 1997, is impermissibly retroactive as applied to criminal conduct.

Rule

The 'stop-time rule' under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B) states that any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end when the alien has committed an offense that renders the alien removable from the United States.

The rule provides in relevant part that 'any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien . . . removable from the United States.' 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1)(B).

Analysis

The court determined that the BIA's application of the stop-time rule was not impermissibly retroactive because the law was clear at the time of Zuluaga's criminal conduct. The court noted that the consequences of his criminal act placed him in a category of aliens eligible for deportation, and thus, the application of the stop-time rule did not violate fair notice or disrupt settled expectations.

The court determined that the BIA's application of the stop-time rule was not impermissibly retroactive because the law was clear at the time of Zuluaga's criminal conduct.

Conclusion

The court denied the petition for review, affirming the BIA's decision that Zuluaga was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to his failure to meet the seven-year continuous residence requirement.

Who won?

The INS prevailed in the case because the court upheld the BIA's decision that Zuluaga's criminal conduct interrupted his continuous residence, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal.

The INS prevailed in the case because the court upheld the BIA's decision that Zuluaga's criminal conduct interrupted his continuous residence.

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